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 This thesis is a comparative case study comparing and contrasting the efforts of 
three countries (United Kingdom, France, and Italy) in their fight to reduce copper wire 
theft incidents within their nations. The ultimate goal of the research is to highlight the 
significant threat posed to critical infrastructure from copper thieves and to offer best-
practice recommendations to policymakers within the United States in response, based on 
the experiences of the three targeted nations. An analysis of the data reveals that the 
United Kingdom has had the most success in the reduction of reported copper wire theft 
incidents, primarily due to its multi-faceted approach to the problem, which includes 
heavy regulation of the scrap recycling industry, centralized law enforcement operations, 
and enhanced criminal statutes.   
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How does the theft of copper wire affect homeland security? At first glance, it 
appears the two subjects would not be inter-connected with each other in any meaningful 
way; however, further analysis leads to the conclusion that copper wire theft incidents in 
the United States can have an extraordinarily detrimental effect on homeland security. 
The U. S. Department of Energy estimates that copper wire theft causes approximately $1 
billion dollars’ worth of damage every year in the United States to facilities and 
businesses deemed by the government to be critical infrastructure.1 
As far back as 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that the 
theft of copper wire in the United States had a variety of detrimental effects, including 
impeding the “flow of electricity, telecommunications, transportation, water supply, 
heating, and security and emergency services.”2 The FBI further concluded that copper 
theft constituted a risk to public safety and national security.3 
The copper wire theft problem is not confined to one community, region, or state; 
instead, it is a problem that touches every corner of the nation. Every single part of the 
United States has been adversely affected by copper wire theft issues, particularly as the 
price of copper on the open market reached historic highs between 2010 and 2012. In 
order to find ways to effectively mitigate the problems associated with copper wire theft, 
policymakers and law enforcement practitioners in the United States must examine 
methods and practices undertaken by other nations to discover best practices in their 
efforts against copper wire theft.  
                                                 
1 Brady Mills, “Metals Theft: Is This Billion Dollar Crime on Your Radar?” National Sheriff 
Magazine, September–October 2014, http://www.isri.org/docs/default-source/scrap-metals-theft/sheriff-
magazine-feature-article-september-2014.pdf?sfvrsn=2, 12.  
2 “Copper Theft Threatens U.S. Critical Infrastructure,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 8, 
2008, accessed September 6, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/copper-thefts.  
3 Ibid., 1.  
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1. Problem Statement 
Copper wire theft is an issue that can potentially have extraordinarily adverse 
implications for critical infrastructure assets located throughout the United States. 
Conservative estimates, as referenced earlier, place the overall financial losses to 
corporate and government entities within the continental United States at approximately 
$1 billion a year.4 In addition to financial losses to private entities, copper wire theft can 
also disrupt or destroy varied pieces of critical infrastructure, including railroads, the 
electrical grid, hospitals, public communications, and a wide variety of other public 
utilities.5 Even seemingly minor instances of copper wire theft can have major 
implications, such as in early 2013 when two thieves stole approximately 7,200 feet of 
copper wire from Federal Aviation Administration property at the Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport, disabling runway approach lights and seriously threatening the 
safety of aircraft using the facility.6 
Currently, there are no coordinated mechanisms in place to determine the exact 
amount of copper wire theft incidents that have occurred in the United States. None of the 
prevention and enforcement methods that have been developed and deployed within the 
United States have proven effective at deterring incidents of copper wire theft. Unless a 
new strategy is developed, the United States likely will face an ever-increasing amount of 
copper wire theft, similar to that which has occurred within the European Union over the 
past 20 years. There are no elements within the United States homeland security 
environment to date that have undertaken a significant examination of the success or 
failure of European Union nations to combat the ever increasing problems associated 
with copper wire theft.  
                                                 
4 Mark Koba, “Copper Theft ‘Like an Epidemic’ Sweeping US,” CNBC, July 30, 2013, accessed May 
1, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100917758.  
5 “Precious Metal: Copper Theft Threatens U.S. Infrastructure,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
December 3, 2008, accessed May 1, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/december/
copper_120308.  
6 “Two Charged for Copper Wire Theft at Sea-Tac Airport,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 18, 
2013, accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/two-charged-copper-wire-theft-sea-tac-
airport.  
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2. Research Questions and the Chapters 
What are effective methods that have been deployed in other nations to reduce the 
amount of copper theft incidents involving critical infrastructure, and are there lessons 
that can be derived from these methods and applied in the United States to reduce the 
incidents and scope of copper wire theft? 
In order to answer those questions effectively, each chapter in this thesis plays a 
specific role. In this introductory chapter, the problem, research methodology, and a 
review of the literature related to the topic are outlined. Chapter II presents a deep 
exploration of the worldwide extent of the copper theft problem followed by a thorough 
exploration of the current problem in the United States and its linkage to the homeland 
security enterprise. Chapters III, IV, and V contain detailed case studies of three different 
European Union nations (France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) that have extensive 
experience confronting the extensive issues cause by copper wire theft. Chapter VI is 
comprised of a detailed analysis of the results of the three case studies presented earlier, 
as well as an analysis of how the lessons learned from each case study can be applied to 
current and potential future policies in the United States. The final chapter, Chapter VII, 
contains specific conclusions and key findings related to the thesis, as well as policy 
recommendations for the United States.  
3. Research Design and Methodology 
The research design utilized for this project is the “multiple case studies” 
technique. Research for this thesis included a structured focus comparison of three 
nations and their enforcement and prevention strategies related to copper wire theft. The 
three-nation sample provided the opportunity to critically analyze different strategies in 
varied environments that could be replicated in the United States.  
Prior to determining viable options for the United States, it was first essential to 
explore the successes or failures other nations have experienced as they designed and 
implemented policies and programs specifically for the purpose of combating copper 
wire theft. A strong effort was made to identify three countries in the European Union 
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that designed and implemented different types programs and approaches, as well as 
identifying nations that experienced varied levels of success addressing the problem.  
Ultimately, the three countries identified for the project were the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy. Each country has had over a decade of experience in its 
attempts to combat rising levels of copper wire theft. Most importantly, each country was 
found to have implemented policies and approaches unique to its nation, which led to 
varying results and conclusions that demonstrate a variety of options to policymakers and 
homeland security practitioners in the United States.  
Comparing the criminal justice efforts of three different countries can be very 
difficult, especially in the light of the fact that there is no standard method of capturing 
statistical data related to copper wire theft. Each country analyzed in this thesis has a 
different method of maintaining data related to copper theft and different internal 
organizations that are tasked with combating the problem. As such, it was imperative to 
develop metrics that could be easily applied to all three countries to effectively interpret 
which countries were successful and which were failures. Each of the metrics chosen for 
this project can be objectively applied to each nation that was studied.  
The first metric involves ascertaining whether or not legislative changes were 
implemented specifically to increase regulation of the legitimate scrap recycling industry. 
Each of the three countries selected for the case study is a democracy that relies on a 
parliamentary system of government. Additionally, each of the three countries is 
capitalistic in nature and relies on a variety of regulatory measures to control commercial 
interests within its respective nation. In effect, each country relies on relatively the same 
method to propose legislation, pass legislation, and implement new regulatory measures 
with relation to industries operating within its borders. Therefore, the legislative change 
metric can be applied without bias to each case.  
For the same reason, this researcher developed a second metric that examines 
whether or not enhancements to criminal law were made to increase the level of 
punishment associated with copper theft offenses. Each nation’s legal process operates in 
a manner similar to the other two nations, and enhancements in nationwide criminal 
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statutes have evolved from measures implemented within the parliamentary styles of 
government. As such, the criminal penalty metric can be applied equally to Italy, France, 
and the United Kingdom.  
The third metric evaluates changes within each nation to its criminal justice 
strategy that afford its law enforcement agencies the ability to become more effective at 
copper theft enforcement. While each nation examined relies on different approaches to 
criminal justice efforts, each nation is heavily reliant on a combination of national and 
local police forces to enforce criminal laws within its borders. While each country has 
different agencies, the basic structure of large national police forces supplemented by 
small regionally controlled forces is present in all three case studies. Therefore, the 
metric can be applied equally to all nations, regardless of the specific internal structure of 
the agencies.  
The final metric is the most difficult of the four to evaluate impartially simply 
because of the varied method in which criminal justice statistics are captured and 
reported by each government. The last metric is a measurement of whether or not there 
were measured reductions in the amount of incidents of copper theft reported following 
the implementation of the various initiatives through analysis of a variety of different 
reports, including government publications, media stories, and industrial reports. There is 
no standardization of reporting across all three nations, and the case study analysis is 
heavily reliant on figures published by a variety of different entities in each country; 
however, it is still possible to impartially evaluate the efforts of each nation against the 
other two nations by examining the available pertinent statistics regarding copper theft.  
To effectively measure the success of each nation within the four specified 
metrics, the researcher developed a rating scale to evaluate each individual category. The 
rating scale is simple in nature and places each metric on a scale between 1 and 5. For all 
four metrics, 1 is representative of the least success in achieving the goal of the metric, 
and 5 is representative of the most success. An explanation of the ratings for each metric 
follows.  
A. Increased regulation of scrap recycling industry: 
1. No legislative proposal for enhanced legislation.  
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2. Proposal for enhancements but no legislative approval.  
3. Legislative approval for enhanced regulation.  
4. Approval and implementation of enhanced regulations.  
5. Approval, implementation, and resulting in documented reduction 
in theft.  
B. Legal changes to criminal statutes: 
1. No legislative proposal for increased penalties for copper theft 
convictions.  
2. Proposal for enhancements but no legislative approval.  
3. Legislative approval of enhanced penalties.  
4. Approval and implementation of enhanced regulations across 
entire nation.  
5. Approval, implementation, and resulting in documented reduction 
in theft.  
C. Changes to criminal justice strategy: 
1. No change in enforcement efforts and tactics.  
2. Documented examples of enhanced cooperation internally.  
3. Creation of national task force specifically related to copper theft.  
4. Centralization of copper theft operations under one law 
enforcement component.  
5. Centralization of operations and involvement in international 
operations.  
D. Measurable reduction in copper theft incidents: 
1. Increase in copper theft incidents.  
2. No change in amount of incidents as a result of initiatives.  
3. Reduction of less than 50 percent for reported incidents.  
4. Reduction of more than 50 percent for reported incidents.  
5. Reduction of more than 50 percent for reported incidents, 
independent of copper commodity price index.  
While it is difficult to validate the success of one independent nation over another, the 
metrics that have been developed for this thesis allow for an impartial evaluation of the 
efforts of each nation based on quantifiable metrics.  
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Prior to undertaking the case study analysis, it was first necessary to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of available literature and research specifically related to the 
problems associated with copper wire theft.  
B. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Over the past 10 to 15 years, there has been a marked rise in the number of copper 
and precious metal thefts from industries in the United States and throughout the world. 
The law enforcement community has attempted with great effort to understand the 
underlying causes for metal theft and develop ways to combat the problem. The primary 
driver behind the anti-metal theft campaign has been law enforcement entities operating 
inside the European Union that coordinate their activities using with international 
organizations such as Interpol, Pol Primett, and the United Nations.  
European agencies have made great strides combating the problem on their 
continent. They have also been successful at increasing public awareness and engaging 
political entities in the fight against precious metal theft by linking the issue to the hot 
topic of terrorism. Researchers have demonstrated that precious metal thefts from various 
critical infrastructure facilities could have dire consequences for the citizens of Europe, 
as well as their overall economy.  
Unfortunately, the increased awareness of precious metal theft from industrial 
sources has not made its way into the homeland security lexicon of the United States. 
Little thought has been given by researchers to the problems that concentrated metal theft 
could cause to the critical infrastructure of the United States. While private entities, such 
as electrical firms, have published documents highlighting the danger of metal theft, very 
little coordinated action has been taken by law enforcement and governmental bodies to 
solidify security measures and fully explain the problems that society could face as a 
result of metal theft.  
The majority of research within the United States has been funded and conducted 
by private organizations. Within the last five years, however, law enforcement agencies 
have begun to work together to solve the ongoing metal theft epidemic, and a variety of 
sources have highlighted the success of public-private partnerships in reducing metal 
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theft. Additionally, a variety of researchers have begun to publish literature expounding 
upon the unintended consequences of metal theft and the overall vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure assets within the United States.  
This literature review explores four items associated with copper wire and 
precious metal theft from critical infrastructure: a definition of key concepts, an 
exploration of the impact of copper and metal theft on homeland security, the unintended 
consequences of copper and metal theft, and solutions for combating copper cable theft.  
1. Defining Key Concepts 
The issue of the effect of precious metal theft on critical infrastructure is a 
difficult topic for many outside of certain industrial circles to understand. As a result, 
many governmental organizations and private entities have gone to great lengths over the 
past five years to push literature out to law enforcement organizations, private trade 
groups, and political entities. The majority of the documentation is designed to simplify 
the concepts associated with precious metal theft and relate them to more easily 
understood types of crime and terrorism. For instance, a significant report published by 
the U. S. Department of Energy in 2010 sought to provide a brief synopsis of the issues 
faced by electric companies in the United States when they are targeted by copper wire 
thieves.7 The report was clearly designed to provide policymakers in the United States a 
broad overview of the potential economic catastrophe to the electrical grid that could 
result from a large-scale theft operation. Unfortunately, the report focused only on the 
financial implications of metal theft and included no detailed exploration of the overall 
homeland security implications of the topic.  
A variety of other sources have tried to present the homeland security 
implications of metal theft, albeit it in a very limited manner. The National Research 
Council (NRC) in 2012 and published through the National Academies Press undertook 
the publication of a primer on the terror implications associated with an attack on the 
electrical grid. In the final report, the NRC noted how the private industry has spent years 
preparing for a comprehensive terror attack on the electrical system within the United 
                                                 
7 P. A. Baker et al., “The ‘Red Gold’ Rush and Severe Electrical Burns,” Burns 34 (2007): 885–887.  
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States.8 While the report highlighted measures that would be taken in the event of a 
coordinated terror attack, it lacked the imagination to address other issues, such as metal 
theft, which could have an equally damaging effect on the electrical grid. The report is 
valuable for the purposes of this research because it outlines the broad effects of a 
disruption to the electrical system. The research developed in the report could easily be 
extrapolated onto other forms of disruption, including attacks from metal thieves.  
Aside from the Department of Energy report and the report funded by the 
National Research Council, there are multiple other documents and research pieces that 
can be utilized to define the key concepts associated with precious metal theft. Most of 
the research has been published by private entities. For example, the North American 
Reliability Corporation, an organization founded and funded by large private utility 
support corporations, funded a research piece authored by Louis Dabdoub in 2011 that 
focused strongly on the economic impact of copper wire theft on the electrical grid.9 
While the piece was heavily slanted towards identifying private means to combat the 
issue of wire theft, it did conceptually identify the link between copper wire theft and a 
disabling of utilities to provide an adequate power supply to the citizens and industry of 
the United States.  
Jasvir Gill’s research piece, also funded by the North American Reliability 
Corporation and published in 2011, expounded upon the data in the Dabdoub piece by 
further clarifying the link between copper wire theft and catastrophic electrical grid 
failure.10Gill’s research requires critical examination, however, because his stated goal 
within the piece is to advance a series of defense measures to utility providers from a 
corporation he owns and operates.  
                                                 
8 National Research Council, Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2012), http://www.wiresgroup.com/docs/reports/
WPF_Terrorism%20and%20The%20Electric%20Power%20Delivery%20System.pdf.  
9 Louis Dabdoub, Electrical Facility Threats and Violence, North American Reliability Corporation, 
October 20, 2011, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.nerc.com/files/6_Dabdoub_10-20_v2.pdf.  
10 Jasvir Gill, Continuous Monitoring: A New Approach to Secure Critical Infrastructure (Atlanta, 
GA: North American Reliability Corporation, 2011, accessed October 1, 2014, http://www.nerc.com/files/
5_Jasvir_Gill_AlertEnterprise_Continuous_Monitoring_V1. 0.pdf.  
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Overall, the available literature designed to identify the key concepts associated 
with precious metal theft is not substantial. The pieces included in this review account for 
approximately 70 percent of the research currently available directly related to the topic. 
Further research is necessary within this subtopic to define fully the key concepts in 
terms easily understood by policymakers and law enforcement leaders.  
2. Exploring the Impact of Copper and Metal Theft on Homeland 
Security 
The amount of usable research currently in the field that explores the impact of 
copper and metal theft on homeland security is far less extensive than the key concepts 
section. There has not been a significant amount of analysis regarding the specific effect 
of copper and metal theft on homeland security. Furthermore, a review of the research 
available indicates that the issue has not meaningfully affected the organizations charged 
with defending the United States homeland.  
The only major government document specifically tied to the issue was published 
in August of 2011, shortly before the 10-year anniversary of 9/11. The report, issued by 
the Department of Homeland Security, was directed at governmental entities and private 
interests with a vested interest in homeland security infrastructure (e.g., electrical grid, 
railroads).11The document is incredibly short, and as with most governmental bulletins, is 
lacking in substantial detail and is devoid of notations listing additional resources. When 
the document was published, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) put those 
industries and agencies responsible for protecting critical infrastructure on notice that 
DHS viewed copper theft as a clear and present danger to the homeland security 
apparatus.  
In the years following the release of the Department of Homeland Security report, 
multiple other federal, state, and private organizations have published documents 
highlighting the extensive problems associated with copper wire theft and their associated 
                                                 
11 “DHS Warns Copper Thefts on the Rise,” Homeland Security News Wire, August 18, 2011, 
accessed June 1, 2015, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dhs-warns-copper-thefts-rise.  
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costs. Many of these reports are similar in nature to the DHS report and merely highlight 
the problem rather than proposing intervention strategies.  
Shortly after the publication of the DHS report, researchers tied to the electric 
industry began publishing pieces describing the actual damage that could be wrought by a 
series of concentrated copper wire thefts. For example, Douglas Carpenter and Richard 
Prevost, writing for a publication called The Electricity Grid in 2012, surmised that the 
nationalization of the electrical grid of the United States would produce a better overall 
security plan for the industry.12 Carpenter and Prevost provided no comprehensive 
research to support their theory; however, the value of their work lies within the 
extensive discussion of how ill equipped the electrical industry is to fending off a major 
attack. The piece went on to describe the ramifications of a coordinated attack on the 
grid, including estimated financial losses and likely civilian casualties. Carpenter and 
Prevost’s work is the only private research to date that discusses in detail the 
vulnerability of the electrical grid in the United States.  
In order to explore the homeland security ramifications of a strike on the electrical 
grid of the United States, it is also necessary to examine what measures have been 
introduced in Europe to combat similar problems. The European Union and its plethora 
of law enforcement organizations are far ahead of the United States in recognizing and 
identifying the threat to infrastructure from precious metal thieves. Furthermore, many 
countries in the European Union have passed measures with enhanced penalties for 
criminal convictions that identify copper thieves as terrorists.  
Founded in early 2010, Pol-Primett is the largest organization created to address 
copper wire theft in the European Union. In 2015, the organization was comprised of law 
enforcement, intelligence units, and private industrial partners from eight member 
nations, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Poland. Pol-Primett has published perhaps the most extensive anti-copper wire theft 
document currently available to researchers. The document, titled Metal Theft: An 
Emerging Threat to Europe’s Economic Security, not only detailed the overall effect of 
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copper theft on critical infrastructure, it also provided a blueprint for how public-private 
partnerships could attack the problem through a variety of means.13 In addition to the 
extensive research provided by the organization, the document also provided a detailed 
listing of subject matter experts and governmental documents available from each of the 
member nations.  
In order to articulate the threat to the United States homeland effectively, further 
research will need to be obtained from European governmental sources as well as 
members of the Pol-Primett organization. Pol-Primett has paved the way for researchers 
in the United States to devise ways to begin notifying policymakers of the potential threat 
to the homeland, as well as best practices from an organization with an extensive 
experience combating the issue of precious metal theft.  
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of research pieces available from 
foreign organizations and governmental bodies as there is no dedicated clearinghouse for 
publications of that nature. Extensive research is needed accessing each of the country’s 
governmental library databases to overcome the lack of research in the United States.  
3. Unintended Consequences of Copper and Metal Theft 
The most thoroughly researched section of the current research problem is the 
section regarding the unintended consequences of copper and metal theft. Research has 
already been proffered in the two previous sections that demonstrated that one of the 
major consequences of copper and metal theft is the overall threat it creates for critical 
infrastructure within the United States and the European Union. What about the other 
consequences of copper and metal theft? 
One of the most interesting unintended consequences identified is the threat to the 
public health system. Multiple researchers in the medical industry have published pieces 
in journals as diverse as the American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology and 
Burns. Writing in Burns in 2007, P. A. Baker et al. clearly identified that those 
                                                 
13 Pol-Primett, “Metal Theft: An Emerging Threat to Europe’s Economic Security” (draft, Pol-Primett, 
United Kingdom, 2013), http://www.agenformedia.com/assets/files/pdf/Pol-
PRIMETT%20Research%20Paper%20February%202013%20Version%206.pdf.  
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individuals intent on stealing copper cable from electrical plants and railroads risked 
severe, life threatening, burns and injuries each time they attempted to do so.14The 
premise of the research of Baker and his associates was also explored by Allison Taylor 
and her research partners in a 2003 piece titled “Death During Theft from Electric 
Utilities.” In their research, Taylor and her companions noted the marked rise in electrical 
burn cases reported by hospitals in the United States over the previous 10 years.15 
While research on burn victims certainly does not directly support the hypothesis 
that precious metal theft is a threat to homeland security, it is valuable in the sense that it 
can be presented to policymakers so they can foster a greater understanding of the 
inherent dangers associated with such crimes. Further research is needed to directly tie 
electrical burns sustained during a criminal operation to an actual threat to the homeland 
security of the United States.  
Aside from the topic of unintended consequence of burn victims, the British 
House of Commons Transport Committee has published the only relevant piece regarding 
the impact of copper wire theft on railroads. While no extensive research has been 
published cataloging the damage caused to United States railroads by copper thieves, the 
British government produced a report both highlighting the number of reported theft 
incidents along with the consequences of large scale theft.16 It should be noted that the 
research compiled by the House of Commons applies directly to private entities, as 
railroads operating within the United Kingdom’s boundaries were privatized between the 
years of 1994 and 1997.  
The House of Commons research is valuable as it provides a framework that can 
be adapted for an exploration of copper thefts from United States railroads, the bulk of 
which are owned by private corporations. The British report established the direct and 
indirect costs of copper wire theft, as well as the overall damage caused to the 
                                                 
14 Baker et al., “The ‘Red Gold’ Rush and Severe Electrical Burns,” 885–87.  
15 Allison Taylor et al., “Death during Theft from Electric Utilities,” American Journal of Forensic 
Medicine and Pathology 24, no. 2 (2003): 173–76.  
16 House of Commons, Transport Committee, Cable Theft on the Railway, 14th report (2012), 1–23, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1609/1609.pdf.  
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transportation network.17 Executives from Network Rail, the primary owner and operator 
of rail infrastructure in England, Wales, and Scotland, stated at a hearing that they had 
sustained direct costs of nearly £43 million pounds associated with copper wire theft 
between the years of 2008 and 2011.18 Network Rail officials also estimated that 
approximately 3.8 million passenger journeys on rail in the United Kingdom were 
disrupted or cancelled in 2011 as a result of copper wire theft incidents. The indirect costs 
to the overall economy of such disruptions are nearly incalculable.19 The research could 
have gone further and explored some of the more minute details of disruption, including 
delays to passenger train and freight trains, and the overall impact of such delays on the 
economy as a whole.  
To better understand the effect of copper wire theft on United States railroads, it 
is necessary to conduct research that examines the amount of reported criminal cases, the 
actual monetary damages resulting from theft, and the direct and indirect results to the 
overall economy of the United States. Researchers should also review documentation 
from the U. S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Railroad Administration, and 
the Surface Transportation Board, as well as the private advocacy group called the 
American Association of Railroads. The only way to clearly demonstrate the threat posed 
by copper thieves to United States’ railroads is to explore actual data that has already 
been collected by those entities.  
In addition to the economic disruption caused to railroads by copper thieves, there 
has been additional research into the unintended consequence precious metal thieves have 
on the overall costs associated with the products they steal. A piece published in the 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency in 2014 hypothesized that copper thieves 
directly impacted the overall economy by skewing the price of the commodities they 
stole within the legitimate marketplace.20 The research noted that fluctuations in the price 
                                                 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 8.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Aiden Sidebottom, Matt Ashby, and Shane Johnson, “Copper Cable Theft: Revisiting the Price-
Theft Hypothesis,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 51, no. 5 (2014): 684–700.  
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of precious metals have the potential to affect many different facets of the overall 
economy, including consumer costs and the overall costs associated with constructing 
and operating critical infrastructure.21 
In order to round out this section of the research, more consideration should be 
given unidentified, unintended consequences, of metal theft. As noted earlier, the purpose 
of highlighting unintended consequences is to engage policymakers at a more direct level 
than the abstract hypothesis of the overall direct effect of precious metal theft on 
homeland security.  
4. Solutions for Combating Copper Cable Theft 
There have been many publications issued by a variety of entities over the past 10 
years highlighting various methods that have been used to detect and prevent precious 
metal theft from critical infrastructure. The bulk of the publications have been presented 
by private industries, such as security firms, intent on advancing their own products. 
Additionally, reports have been issued over the past three years from industrial groups as 
diverse as the American Public Power Association, Westar Energy, Southern Maryland 
Electric Cooperative, and the National Electrical Manufacturer’s Association, among 
others. Within the United States, there has been no significant research published that 
adequately addresses how to combat copper cable theft. As previously mentioned, the 
Pol-Primett publication provided a blueprint for how the European Union has attacked 
the problem.  
The most extensive research, and proposal, published to date regarding the United 
States approach was written by Jennifer Morrissey and David Shaffer in 2014. They 
published a proposal for a two-pronged approach to combat wire theft utilizing both 
public and private resources.22 The strength of their argument is that it mirrors one of the 
major approaches highlighted within the Pol-Primett document. Morrissey and Shaffer 
adequately argued that neither government nor private industry is capable of attacking 
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precious metal theft working on their own.23 Instead both entities must work together in 
concert to develop new strategies and funding mechanisms to adequately begin to solve 
the problem.24 The majority of the research of Morrissey and Shaffer was drawn from 
documents produced by state and local partnerships, as well as recommendations from 
the Congressional Research Service.  
Aside from the Morrissey and Shaffer document, there are two other research 
pieces that address solutions for combating precious metal theft. Working on a grant from 
the United States Department of Justice Office of Community Policing in 2010, Brandon 
Kooi compiled an extensive document aimed at informing state and municipal agencies 
nationwide of the growing number of cases of scrap metal theft throughout the country.25 
Though Kooi did not extend his research or recommendations beyond scrap metal, his 
hypothesis could easily be applied to the issue of copper metal theft. The other 
noteworthy item with Kooi’s research is that he derived his statistical data directly from 
the uniformed crime reports compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI 
data revealed the clearest picture available noting the marked rise in metal theft 
throughout the country.26 
Kevin Whitacre’s 2008 article, published in Metals Theft Database Pilot Study, 
only included information on scrap metal theft, similar to the Kooi piece. The value of 
Whiteacre’s research lies in its study of 678 reported types of metal theft in a four state 
radius surrounding Indianapolis, Indiana during the first quarter of 2008.27 His research 
is one the only studies available in the United States that specifically looked at actual 
crime data to support his overall hypothesis that metal theft is increasing nationwide.  
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Brandon Kooi, “Theft of Scrap Metal,” Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific 
Series, no. 58 (2010), http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/metal_theft.pdf.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Kevin Whiteacre, Metals Theft Database Pilot Study (Indianapolis, IN: University of Indianapolis 
Community Research Center, 2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/225026.pdf, 1–11.  
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C. SYNOPSIS 
The material presented in this literature review is a synopsis of the bulk of 
material currently available that demonstrates the homeland security threat posed by 
precious metal theft. As indicated previously, more extensive research should be obtained 
from foreign entities to examine how they have fought the problem of metal theft over 
the past 10 years. Additionally, government entities and homeland security practitioners 
need to conduct research in cooperation with private entities in the United States to 
ascertain just how significant the threat to infrastructure is and the ultimate consequence 
of not adequately protecting critical resources from precious metal thieves.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to present options to homeland security 
practitioners and policymakers in the United States for confronting the worldwide copper 
theft epidemic. As the world economy continues to expand and the price for copper 
continues to soar, the United States and its many components of critical infrastructure 
will continue to be adversely affected by copper wire theft.  
In order to find an effective way forward for homeland security practitioners in 
the United States, this thesis includes a comprehensive case study analysis of three 
countries well versed in the fight against copper theft, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Italy. By effectively analyzing each country’s successes and failures a clear path may be 
developed for the United States to combat the problem effectively.  
Prior to examining each individual nation, it is first necessary to understand the 
overall extent of the copper theft epidemic throughout the world and in the United States. 
The next chapter explores the extent of the overall problem and the specific relation of 
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II. THE COPPER THEFT EPIDEMIC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before attempting to find a reasonable path forward for the United States in the 
fight against copper wire theft, it is first imperative to explore the current level of the 
problem in the country and the significant impact it has had on homeland security. It is 
also important to understand why thieves target copper and the overall extent of the 
copper theft problem throughout the rest of the world. Understanding the extent of the 
problem in the United States and the reasons behind the ever-growing amount of thefts, 
as well as the extent of the problem throughout the world will afford the opportunity to 
explore best practices and find reasonable solutions to mitigate the problems currently 
confronted by law enforcement practitioners throughout the nation.  
The exploration of the copper theft problem in this chapter includes the following 
elements: an explanation of why copper is targeted by thieves throughout the world, a 
review of the extent of the copper theft problem throughout the world, examples of 
damage to critical infrastructure in the United States and their linkage to the homeland 
security enterprise, as well as a review of the current level of theft in the United States, 
and the approaches that have been used in the past to combat the problem.  
B. WHY COPPER? 
Why is copper such a sought after commodity, and why is it so often used in 
facilities that are often classified throughout the world as critical infrastructure? Those 
questions must be answered in order to understand why the theft of copper has reached 
epidemic portions throughout the industrialized world.  
Copper has been referred to in the press by various writers as “red gold.”28 The 
demand for copper throughout the world has soared since the early part of the twenty-first 
century. In addition, copper is used in many facilities and components of critical 
                                                 
28 Scott Berinato, “Red Gold Rush: The Copper Theft Epidemic,” CSO Online, February 1, 2007, 
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infrastructure because it is a superb conductor of electricity that is resistant to corrosion.29 
In the United States, copper products are generally used within four industrial categories: 
building construction, electrical, and electronic products; industrial machinery and 
equipment; transportation equipment; and consumer and general products.30 
Within those four broad categories, copper is used in a variety of ways in various 
different forms of infrastructure. In the energy sector, for instance, copper cabling is 
heavily used in all facets of the industry, including power generation, transmission, and 
distribution.31 In the railroad industry, copper cabling is used in a variety of manners, 
including providing electricity in high voltage electrical lines, serving as a conduit for the 
fiber optic networks that comprise the signaling and safety systems, and as relays for the 
complicated switching mechanisms used to move trains from one track to another.32 
Railroads and energy companies are not the only entities that heavily use copper 
wire in their facilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in an assessment written in 
2008, noted that copper is used in a variety of industries that are targeted by thieves 
including: “electrical sub-stations, cellular towers, telephone land lines, railroads, water 
wells, construction sites, and vacant homes.”33 Copper’s heavy use in industrial 
applications has resulted in a situation where the demand for copper far outweighs the 
supply driving market prices for the commodity to historic highs. Furthermore, the rising 
cost of copper has also been the primary driver of the ever-increasing rate of thefts 
throughout the United States and the rest of the world.  
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As economies in countries, such as China, have expanded since the beginning of 
the twenty-first century the price for copper has steadily increased. The price for copper 
on the open market in 2003 was approximately $0.65 cents per pound on the London 
Metals exchange.34 By 2006, the price was approximately $4.00 per pound, an 
astronomical increase by any measure.35 On average, copper prices have continued to 
increase throughout the decade as the need for copper in developing nations has 
continued to expand. Figure 1 shows copper prices between 1989 and 2014, illustrating 
the significant spike in copper prices in 2010.  
Figure 1.  Copper Prices 
 
Source: “Historical Copper Prices and Price Chart,” October 1, 2015, accessed October 5, 
2015, http://www. infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/copper/all/.  
To meet the increasing demand for copper throughout the world, various mining 
corporations have increased production and attempted to meet the market demand with 
                                                 
34 Berinato, “Red Gold Rush: The Copper Theft Epidemic,” 4.  
35 Ibid.  
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copper mining initiatives. Unfortunately, the demand for copper far outpaces the amount 
of copper that can be safely mined each year. In fact, in spite of the increased demand for 
copper, the output of copper mines in the United States has not dramatically changed 
much over the past 15 years with the mining sector reporting a total of approximately 1. 2 
million tons of mined copper per year.36 In order to meet the explosive demand for 
copper, the industry has turned to waste and scrap metal refining.37 
Copper, as opposed to other metals that are targeted by thieves, is easily 
recognizable due to its distinctive red coloring and can located and separated with little 
trouble from the inside of complicated machinery and cabling structures by individuals 
that have no formal training in industrial applications.38 The bulk of copper used in 
industrial applications is not tagged with unique identifying marks. In addition, as the 
product generally does not show any discoloration with age, it is incredibly difficult for 
legitimate scrap dealers to ascertain whether the copper sold to their business is a new 
product that was recently stolen, or an old product that was legitimately scrapped from 
older machinery.39 
As copper prices spiked throughout the world, thieves quickly realized that copper 
was a commodity worth stealing. In the United States, the number of theft incidents has 
risen dramatically each year. The National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) reported a 
staggering 81 percent rise in metal theft incidents between 2008 and 2011 alone.40 The 
NICB’s claim data showed approximately 13,000 claims filed between 2006 and 2008 as 
a result of copper wire theft incidents, compared to over 25,000 between 2009 and 
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2011.41 A chart created by the U. S. Department of Energy in 2010, which includes data 
from the Institute for Scrap Recycling Industries as well as media reports and information 
the NICB, demonstrated the clear rise in copper theft incidents in relation to copper 
prices in the United States between January of 2000 and August of 2010 (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2.  Copper Theft Trends January 2000–August 2010 
 
Source: Rout et al., An Updated Assessment of Copper Wire Thefts from Electrical 
Utilities, 2.  
The Department of Energy graph (Figure 2) accurately demonstrates that as 
copper prices rise, reported incidents of copper theft generally show a corresponding rise. 
Copper theft is not limited to small-scale operations either. In fact, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has repeatedly warned businesses and governmental entities that organized 
crime outfits commit large-scale thefts targeting cellular phone towers, railroads, 
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electrical sub-stations, and other vital components of critical infrastructure.42 As long as 
the price of copper remains high, it will continue to present an appealing target for both 
minor criminals and large organized crime groups.  
While the data presented in this section predominantly references incidents and 
data from the United States, the copper theft issue is a problem that has plagued a variety 
of nations throughout the entire world.  
C. A WORLD PROBLEM 
The list of nations that have been adversely affected by copper theft is staggering. 
Government and media reports from diverse nations throughout the world highlight the 
deepening problem of copper theft, particularly as the price of the commodity has been 
driven to record levels as economies have expanded. Copper theft reports have flooded 
the media from locations as geographically diverse as Zambia, England, the United 
States, and the Philippines.43 Media reports indicate that countries in the European Union 
appear to have been the hardest hit by copper thieves over the past 10 years.  
For example, the Home Office of the United Kingdom reported that the nation 
suffered $1.16 billion (U. S. currency [USC]) in losses associated with metal theft in 
calendar year 2010.44 Thefts in the United Kingdom have occurred in virtually every 
sector of critical infrastructure. This has caused issues such as 16,000 hours of passenger 
delays over three years to the railroads and nearly 6,000 theft incidents from electrical 
companies throughout the nation in 2011, which caused blackouts in over 25,500 
homes.45 The United Kingdom is not alone in its susceptibility to metal theft.  
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Countries of all shapes, sizes, and economic backgrounds have been targeted by 
copper thieves in recent years. In Jamaica, for instance, the country’s three major public 
utilities, the Jamaica Public Service (Electric), the National Water Commission (NWC), 
and LIME (telecommunications) have reported cumulative losses $12. 6 million (USC) 
associated with metal thefts between 2009 and 2012.46 Estimates from law enforcement 
authorities in Portugal pegged the annual losses from utilities and businesses in the 
country in 2011 to be approximately $48 million (USC).47 In South Africa, it is estimated 
that copper cable thefts cost the nation’s electrical providers nearly $500 million (USC) 
per year due to the extensive costs associated with outages and repairing facilities 
destroyed by thieves.48 
Various types of infrastructure are appealing to copper thieves. For instance, 
railroads throughout Europe are heavily targeted by copper thieves, and nearly every 
major country has reported extensive issues associated with copper theft incidents. The 
state railway company of Germany, Deutsche Bahn, reported that thefts from the railroad 
rose approximately 50 percent between 2010 and 2011.49 In Greece, the national railroad 
company reported losses of $13 million (USC) associated with copper theft over a period 
of two years, while the Czech Republic reported losses of $25 million (USC) in 2010 
alone.50 Aside from the heavy monetary costs of copper wire theft to railroads, the 
damage to infrastructure often causes a variety of consequences. In Belgium, for instance, 
the national railroad infrastructure corporation, Infrabel, repeatedly cites copper theft 
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incidents for the extensive delays and service disruptions to trains that operate throughout 
its nation.51 
Clearly, there has been demonstrable damage to the economies and critical 
infrastructure facilities of countries throughout the world. How though have thieves 
targeted the United States, and how do those theft incidents have a measurable impact on 
homeland security? 
D. ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
As noted in the previous section, copper wire theft is clearly an issue throughout 
the world posing significant economic implications for a variety of nations in differing 
geographic locations throughout the world. Does the theft problem have an impact on the 
homeland security enterprise in the United States? The answer lies within an explanation 
of what defines critical infrastructure in the United States, coupled with a review of 
reported theft incidents that have occurred throughout the nation.  
The Department of Homeland Security defines critical infrastructure as those 
sectors that: 
Compose the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would 
have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination thereof.52 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 further articulates that critical infrastructure in 
the United States exists within 16 clearly defined sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, 
communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency 
services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, 
healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors and materials, 
transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems.53 Quite simply, critical 
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infrastructure in the United States could easily be defined as “something that people 
depend on, either directly or indirectly, for their lives and well being, in any time 
frame.”54 
Within those 16 defined sectors there are a variety of examples over the past 
10years of attacks perpetrated by copper thieves. In the water and wastewater system 
sector, for example, a variety of incidents have been covered in the media over the past 
decade. In 2007, for instance, copper thieves stole $50.00 worth of copper tubing from 
water wells in San Bernadino County, California, resulting in residents being forced to 
conserve water for over 10 days.55 In 2014, copper thieves disabled the drinking water 
supply in the Kalihi Valley in Hawaii when they stole approximately 2,000 feet of tubing 
from telemetry cables that were designed to alert officials about problems with the water 
supply.56 
Aside from water sector issues, copper wire thieves also have been known to 
cause serious problems for emergency services. In Camden, New Jersey in 2011, thieves 
stole the brass, which contains copper, fittings from fire hydrants throughout one 
neighborhood resulting in the hydrants becoming useless. During a 12-alarm fire in the 
town, the fire department could not effectively use water from the hydrants resulting in 
the destruction of a swath of property that left 12 families homeless.57 
Citizens in other communities in the United States have also had their lives and 
homes directly threatened as a result of copper theft. For instance, in Luther, Oklahoma, 
thieves were arrested in August of 2015 after they had rendered the town’s tornado sirens 
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useless when they stole copper wiring from the systems.58 Unfortunately, the attack on 
the warning system was not the first instance of such an attack in the United States. In 
April of 2008 residents in Jackson, Mississippi found out during an actual storm that five 
of their tornado warning sirens had been rendered inoperable by thieves who had 
previously stolen copper wiring from the siren’s housings.59 
The transportation sector is another sector in the in the United States that has also 
been hard hit by copper thieves in recent years. One of the most dangerous of the 
reported theft incidents occurred at the Seattle-Tacoma (SEA-TAC) International Airport 
in February of 2013 when two thieves stole over 3,000 feet of copper wiring from runway 
light towers.60 Had the theft not been discovered by employees before an aircraft actually 
landed, the safety of aircraft landing at the airport would have been severely impacted, 
especially if there had been inclement weather. A similar type of theft occurred a year 
earlier in Modesto, California when two men were found to have stolen thousands of feet 
of wiring from airport lighting towers at the Modesto Airport, rendering an entire runway 
out of service.61 
Railroads and mass transit systems in the United States have also been routinely 
targeted by copper thieves. In May of 2015, two entire subway lines were disabled by 
thieves in New York City who stole nearly 500 feet of copper cable from lines that carry 
power directly to trains.62 The disruption in service caused by the theft was significant as 
service suspensions caused tens of thousands of riders to either be late for or miss work 
altogether.63 Similar types of thefts from mass transit agencies have been reported all 
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over the United States, including the theft of thousands of pounds of copper cabling in 
2011 from the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in San Francisco, California and 
from the Sound Transit system in Seattle, Washington.64 
Amtrak, the nation’s intercity passenger service, has been directly affected on 
many occasions over the past 10 years by copper thieves. In one incident in early January 
of 2012, thieves removed safety signaling wire from a railroad interchange in New 
Jersey, which effectively disabled the railroad for hours and causing mass cancellations 
to Amtrak service as well as numerous New Jersey Transit trains that operate over 
Amtrak tracks.65 In 2013, copper thieves in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania were 
charged by Amtrak Police officers with the theft of nearly 40,000 pounds of copper 
wiring stolen from communications systems, resulting in an extended loss of rail service 
and a financial loss of nearly $500,000 dollars (USC).66 
While the transportation, emergency services, and water sectors have all been 
targeted by copper thieves in recent years, perhaps the most affected sector of critical 
infrastructure in the United States has been the energy sector. The Department of Energy 
published a report in 2007 that noted that calculating the actual number of thefts from 
electric utilities was impossible because theft reports were anecdotal in nature and often 
based solely from media reports. Using reports from a variety of energy corporations, in 
2007, the Department of Energy estimated that total value of damages associated with 
copper wire theft was $900 million (USC).67 When the Department of Energy updated its 
findings with a report in 2010, it included a map, using data derived from media reports, 
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to show how copper theft from energy providers was occurred in every state within the 
United States (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3.  Copper Theft in the United States 
 
Source: Rout, An Updated Assessment of Copper Wire Thefts from Electrical Utilities, 7.  
Data compiled from the Electrical Safety Foundation International found that 
there were nearly 7,600 hours of power outages directly attributed to copper theft in 
2009.68 Aside from the considerable costs associated with power outages, and the cost to 
repair those facilities that are directly impacted, copper thieves can cause a number of 
other outcomes equally damaging to energy companies, including causing fire and 
explosions that case residual damage within the communities serviced by the provider. 
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Explosions and electrocutions can also cause death to those attempting to steal wiring. In 
2008, industry experts estimated that 56 serious injuries and 35 deaths were the result of 
theft attempts at electrical facilities located throughout the country.69 
E. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Unfortunately, as noted by the Department of Energy report, it is nearly 
impossible to ascertain the total damages caused by copper thieves to critical 
infrastructure facilities in the United States due of the lack of coordinated crime 
reporting.70 The best estimate of the overall copper theft problem lies with the National 
Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), which deals directly with claims filed by those directly 
impacted by copper thieves. The NICB estimated that in 2013, 97 percent of all insurance 
claims related to the theft of scrap metal were specifically related to copper.71 
Additionally, a total of 39,976 copper theft incidents were reported to the NICB between 
2011 and 2013.72 Furthermore, the Department of Energy estimates that those reported 
incidents, combined with a significant number of unreported incidents, ultimately results 
in net damages of approximately $1 billion (USC) per year.73 
F. CURRENT METHODS OF INTERDICTION AND REGULATION IN 
UNITED STATES 
The statistics and reports referenced earlier in this chapter clearly demonstrate 
that copper theft is a nationwide problem in the United States. Unfortunately, the problem 
has not been addressed on a national level. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
been involved in a variety of operations targeting organized crime connections with metal 
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theft, the primary driver behind enforcement efforts has been local law enforcement 
agencies.74 
A prime example of local law enforcement efforts in the United States was the 
approach taken by the City of Dayton, Ohio Police Department in response to a growing 
amount of metal thefts within their community. At first, the Dayton Police Department 
began to merely catalogue the amount of complaints specifically related to copper thefts 
using its Community Oriented Policing and Enforcement (C.O.P.E.) team.75After 
determining that reported copper theft incidents were increasing steadily between 2004 
and 2006, the C.O.P.E. team invited members of the city government as well as 
representatives of local scrap dealers to weekly meetings aimed at developing new ways 
to combat the problem.76 The working group agreed on a local ordinance that required all 
individuals selling scrap metal within city limits to be licensed by the city.77 Following 
the passage of the ordinance scrap dealers immediately became more likely to report 
suspicious activity, and the theft of scrap metal within the city limits of Dayton appeared 
to drop significantly. Figures published by the Dayton Police Department show a drop in 
metal theft reports from a height of approximately 800 in 2006 to approximately 400 in 
2008 (see Table 1).  
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Table 1.   Metal Theft Statistics  
 
Source: Center for Problem Oriented Policing, Metal Theft: A Major Problem in Dayton, 
Ohio, 19. 
Other local municipalities have had success curbing the rise of metal theft 
incidents within their communities. For example, the City of Eau Claire, Wisconsin 
experienced a spike similar to Dayton, Ohio in 2006 and 2007. Detectives working for 
the Eau Claire Police Department initially found that scrap dealers operating within city 
limits were generally uncooperative and did not keep records of transactions with scrap 
sellers.78 The Eau Claire Police, following a series of initial failures, eventually worked 
with surrounding jurisdictions and the Wisconsin State Legislature to write, and 
ultimately pass legislation requiring scrap dealers to record identifying information on 
individuals selling scrap within the state.79 The Eau Claire Police reported a 70 percent 
drop in the value of metal stolen between 2006 and 2008—a drop they believe was 
heavily influenced by their local efforts.80 
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Unfortunately, the Dayton, Ohio and Eau Claire, Wisconsin programs appear to 
be outside of the norm as far as response to copper theft within the United States goes. In 
addition, they were initiated before copper prices began to soar towards the end of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century. There is significant anecdotal evidence from a 
variety of sources, including from the NICB and the Electrical Safety Foundation 
International, that show reported incidents of copper increased significantly between 
2008 and 2011—well after the reported successes in Dayton and Eau Claire.  
A variety of measures have been passed by state governments in the United States 
over the past 10 years that are aimed at attacking the metal theft epidemic. Measures 
adopted by the states have included forcing dealers to maintain records of transactions, 
requiring identification from sellers including fingerprint data, installing a waiting period 
for sellers to receive payment, and enhanced penalties for metal theft offenses.81 In fact, 
data compiled from the Institute for Scrap Recycling Industries in 2015 showed that all 
50 state legislatures had at some point between 2008 and 2015 passed legislation 
specifically aimed at combating the growth of metal theft in their respective 
jurisdictions.82 
Unfortunately, data collected from a variety of sources have proven that state 
level efforts have had no measurable impact on the overall national problem. NICB data 
showed that the bulk of the 41,138 metal theft claims filed between 2010 and 2013 came 
from five different states: Ohio, Texas, California, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Each of 
the states noted in the NICB report have enacted enhanced statutes related to metal theft, 
employing a variety of different solutions to the problem. The statistics show that the 
metal theft problem is a nationwide problem and not merely a problem that can be cured 
with local solutions.  
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G. SUMMARY 
As evidence in this thesis clearly shows, the copper theft epidemic has adversely 
affected the United States and many other nations throughout the world. There are a 
myriad of examples of how copper thieves have irreparably damaged critical 
infrastructure directly threatening the safety and well being of citizens all over the nation. 
If the copper theft epidemic were to continue unabated, it is likely that the United States 
will continue to lose approximately a billion dollars a year repairing and replacing 
infrastructure assets throughout the country.  
How then does the United States design and implement a comprehensive 
approach to copper theft? A detailed examination of the approaches taken by three 
different European countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) may possibly 
demonstrate a cohesive way forward for politicians, law enforcement, private industry, 
and government regulators. The following three chapters provide a detailed examination 
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III. UNITED KINGDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine a viable approach to combat the significant copper and scrap 
metal theft problem in the United States, it is first necessary to examine the successes and 
failures of metal theft initiatives in other nations. The first nation that this thesis explores 
in depth is the United Kingdom. The detailed examination of the United Kingdom will 
include background on the copper theft problem within the country and well as a 
definition of what constitutes critical infrastructure within the nation. In addition the 
chapter will identify relevant stakeholders in the country, combined with a review of the 
various regulatory and enforcement efforts that have been undertaken to date. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with a brief analysis of the efforts undertaken within the nation.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The United Kingdom, like many other nations, has been plagued by a substantial 
amount of metal thefts in recent years that have caused significant financial and 
operational problems for various parts of critical infrastructure facilities located 
throughout the country. It is difficult to track the precise number of metal thefts that have 
occurred in the United Kingdom simply because there is no required statistical crime 
reporting data that differentiates metal theft from the wide variety of other larcenies that 
are committed. The British Transport Police (BTP) and the Energy Networks Association 
(ENA) have developed their own metrics, based on specific crime reports and data from 
insurance losses, to produce meaningful statistics related specifically to metal theft. Both 
the BTP and ENA found that metal theft incidents increased by nearly 300 percent 
between 2009 and 2011, while reports of nonmetal theft related larcenies dropped 
significantly.83 
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There are numerous news and governmental reports that extensively highlight the 
problems caused by metal theft in the United Kingdom. In a raid in 2011, for example, 
copper thieves stole nearly six miles of cabling from Network Rail property, resulting in 
approximately $1,080,000 (USC) in damage.84 Network Rail is the governmental entity 
in the United Kingdom responsible for maintaining the nation’s heavy rail infrastructure.  
In addition to the substantial damage to the rail infrastructure, the residual effects 
of copper theft also have resulted in a number of additional consequences. In a separate 
cooper theft from Network Rail of a much smaller nature, damages of approximately 
$123,000. 00 (USC) resulted in delays to approximately 108 trains, causing an average of 
approximately 17 lost passenger hours waiting on delayed travel.85 In calendar year 2010, 
Network Rail reported a total of 6,088 hours of delay attributed directly to copper theft as 
well as nearly $255,000,000 (USC) worth of necessary repairs.86 Delays are not only 
limited to heavy rail operations, as evidenced by the cancellation of 71 subway trains 
during rush hour in Manchester, England after a cable theft on November 21, 2007.87 
C. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
The determination of what constitutes critical infrastructure within the United 
Kingdom is codified in legislative language. The government of the United Kingdom 
defines critical infrastructure as “those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary 
for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which 
daily life in the UK depends.”88 The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 further defined 
critical infrastructure as within the scope of nine sectors: food, energy, water, 
                                                 
84 Sara Malm, “Gang of Thieves Stole SIX MILES of Copper Wiring Worth £700,000 Bringing down 
Telephone Services and Hitting the Rail Network,” Mail Online, January 29, 2013, accessed August 1, 
2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2270339/Gang-thieves-stole-SIX-MILES-copper-wiring-
worth-700-000-bringing-telephone-services-hitting-rail-network.html.  
85 Denise Winterman, “Metal Theft: Britain’s Most Annoying Crime Wave,” BBC News Magazine, 
September 28, 2011, accessed August 4, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15062064.  
86 Ibid., 4.  
87 Luke Bennett, “Assets under Attack: Metal Theft, the Built Environment and the Dark Side of the 
Global Recycling Market,” Environmental Law and Management 20 (2008): 176–83.   
88 “The National Infrastructure,” Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure, accessed August 
13, 2015, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/.  
 39 
communications, transport, health, emergency services, government, and finance.89 
Crime statistics produced by the Home Office showed that 47 percent (approximately 
28,000 incidents) of metal theft offenses in England and Wales between April of 2012 
and March of 2013 were offenses that occurred at facilities designated as part of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure.90 
Transport and energy are those sectors that are most directly vulnerable to metal 
thieves because of their heavy reliance on copper wiring and the placement of facilities 
throughout the country. The economic effect caused by metal theft on the energy sector is 
substantial. The Energy Networks Association (ENA) reported that metal theft cost the 
energy generation industry nearly £12 million in 2010 and close to £60 million in 2011.91 
Aside from economic impact, the ENA also reported numerous electrical outages 
throughout the country during the same timeframe.  
The economic damage caused by metal theft has the potential to have a significant 
impact on all of the critical infrastructure sectors defined by the British government. The 
damage to the overall economy as a result of metal theft was estimated in 2010 to be 
approximately £770 million per year.92 The severe economic consequences greatly 
hamper the ability of the government and private entities to adequately make repairs and 
enhancements to critical infrastructure facilities.  
D. STAKEHOLDERS  
A wide variety of stakeholders in the United Kingdom have an interest in the 
protection of critical infrastructure and the reduction in the number of metal thefts in the 
nation. First and foremost is the government of the United Kingdom. The government of 
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the United Kingdom has a vested interest in keeping the various military facilities located 
throughout the British Isles in operating condition, and it has invested an extensive 
amount of money in protecting those facilities from metal thieves. The government of the 
United Kingdom also operates Network Rail, and it is responsible for ensuring upkeep on 
the nation’s many rail lines.  
While Network Rail is ultimately responsible for the rail infrastructure, there are 
numerous private railroad operators throughout the nation that are directly impacted by 
attacks on the nation’s railroad infrastructure. Currently, there are 28 different train 
companies that operate on Network Rail property.93 Each of those operators can suffer 
severe financial consequences when trains are delayed or unable to operate because of 
metal theft attacks on infrastructure, including safety components such as signaling 
facilities.  
Additional governmental stakeholders include the various police forces around 
the nation. A total of 46 different police agencies operate in the United Kingdom.94 
Agencies range in size from small county constabularies to the more well-known London 
Metropolitan Police and national forces, including the British Transport Police. Each law 
enforcement agency within the country has been directly affected by copper and metal 
theft within their jurisdictions. As the primary agency responsible for protecting the 
nation’s transport services, the British Transport Police have taken the lead in recent 
years as the head of multiple task forces created to stem the tide of rising incidents 
involving copper and metal theft.95 
In addition to the various government agencies, there are numerous private 
stakeholders that have a vested interest in reducing the substantial amount of copper and 
metal thefts that have plagued the nation since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In the energy sector, there are a total of six companies, known as the “Big Six,” which 
provide gas and electric services to approximately 50 million customers throughout the 
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country.96 The Big Six is comprised of the following corporations: British Gas, Npower, 
SSE, Scottish Power, E. on, and EDF.97 
In addition to the Big Six, there are various other smaller entities that deliver 
power and gas to customers. The smaller entities account for approximately 7.5 percent 
of the customers located in the United Kingdom.98 All energy providers in the United 
Kingdom have been victimized by metal thieves over the years and have sought ways to 
reduce the overall amount of theft and subsequent disruptions in service caused by 
thieves.  
The Energy Networks Association (ENA) represents the bulk of energy providers 
in the United Kingdom. The ENA is a conglomerate industry association representing the 
majority of gas and electricity providers in the country.99 The ENA has been at the 
forefront of private industry associations lobbying for various legislative and law 
enforcement initiatives designed to protect their member corporations from the financial 
damage and disruption caused by copper thieves.  
The final stakeholder that has an important role to play in the copper theft 
problem is the scrap metal recycling industry, represented publicly by the British Metals 
Recycling Association (BMRA). The BMRA represents businesses, large and small, that 
specialize in processing scrap metal for reuse in a wide variety of applications. The scrap 
metal recycling industry is noted in BMRA literature as being a £5.6 billion a year 
enterprise.100 As efforts to reduce copper theft have accelerated in the United Kingdom, 
the BMRA has become more active in law enforcement operations and ensuring that their 
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member’s voices are heard by politicians considering legislative changes to the rules 
governing the scrap metal business.  
E. INTERDICTION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACTION, REGULATION, 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
To combat the extensive metal threat problem in the United Kingdom, the 
government and various private industry stakeholders have relied on a variety of 
methods. Initially, the methods used to combat the rising metal theft problem in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century mirrored the traditional law enforcement and security 
methods that have been used since policing became a profession. Police respond to the 
scene of a metal theft, record the crime, and then proceed to the next call. The business 
owner or governmental agency then replaced the metal that was taken and the scene 
repeats itself over and over again. There is little evidence during that time that any of the 
major police agencies in the United Kingdom used proven law enforcement strategies 
such as gathering information, intelligence, and utilizing forensic recovery tools to 
investigate incidents involving metal theft properly.101 
A primary example of the type of initiatives undertaken in the United Kingdom 
during that timeframe was Operation Fragment, which targeted metal theft in the eastern 
portion of Somerset County, England beginning in late 2008. In response to a growing 
amount of thefts from utility companies, the Avon and Somerset Constabulary assembled 
Operation Fragment using tried and tested methods of community policing. Officers from 
the constabulary relied on undercover officers to verify that scrap yards were adhering to 
regulations. The constabulary also used a variety of media tools to raise public awareness 
about metal theft, and the agency relied heavily on community engagement at vulnerable 
locations such as schools, churches, and public utilities.102 Rather than simply recording 
the metal thefts, the Avon and Somerset Constabulary attempted to deploy proven assets 
and strategies to attack the problem proactively.  
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Operation Fragment was typical of early operations aimed at copper wire thieves. 
To attack the problem, law enforcement did what it is historically known for, targeting 
the actual perpetrators of criminal acts and ensuring their prosecution for the wire thefts. 
Arrest statistics were staggering during the time period of 2006 to 2013. In 2011 alone, 
the British Transport Police reported its officers arrested over 1,000 metal theft 
suspects.103 In spite of enhanced law enforcement tactics and a significant amount of 
arrests, incidents involving copper wire theft have continued to rise.  
As the metal theft problem continued to accelerate at an alarming speed towards 
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the government has undertaken 
new methods to attempt to confront and reduce the growing problem. For instance, in 
early 2012, law enforcement and the British Metals Recycling Association launched a 
collaborative effort, a new program called Operation Tornado.104 Operation Tornado was 
launched first in County Durham, an area heavily affected by copper theft. The goal of 
the operation was to reduce incidents of copper wire theft by putting a heavy 
investigative and regulatory focus on the scrap dealers operating in the county.  
As part of Operation Tornado, licensed scrap metal dealers operating in the 
county agreed to buy scrap metal only after receiving valid photo identification from the 
seller and then maintaining a copy of the identification for a period of six months.105 
Sales of scrap metal in exchange for cash payments without proof of identification were 
long believed by law enforcement to be a significant reason why copper theft was such a 
lucrative enterprise.  
In addition to the enhanced regulation, law enforcement entities, including the 
Durham, Cleveland, and Northumbria Police Forces, continued a multijurisdictional 
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effort to identify and arrest known copper wire thieves.106 Additionally, periodic and 
unannounced inspection visits were undertaken by regulators at scrap dealers to ensure 
compliance with the identification regulation. The identification regulation was 
developed initially as a voluntary trial mechanism, and law enforcement leaders did not 
believe that many scrap dealers would voluntarily participate in the program. To their 
surprise, at the conclusion of 2012, law enforcement reported that 100 percent of the 
licensed scrap dealers within County Durham were compliant with the enhanced 
regulation.107 
Initial statistics related to Operation Tornado compiled by law enforcement 
seemed to show that the licensing component of the program had a significant impact on 
crime rates. The British Transport Police (BTP) reported that County Durham reported a 
55 percent reduction in offenses, as well a separate 60 percent reduction in incidents of 
copper wire theft from railroad property patrolled by the BTP.108 
The success of Operation Tornado caused the government of the United Kingdom 
to take notice and a strong effort was made to find ways to replicate the success of the 
operation nationwide. The National Metal Theft Task Force, led by the British Transport 
Police, was launched in conjunction with Operation Tornado in January of 2012.109 The 
task force was initially comprised of the BTP, local and regional police forces, 
representatives from various industry associations, insurance companies, and the British 
Metals Recycling Association.110 The task force received an initial budget of 
approximately £5 million, with additional funding boosts of £500,000 in calendar years 
2013 and 2014.111 Growing out of the successes of the task force and Operation Tornado, 
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a legislative solution to the metal theft problem was passed by the government in early 
2013.  
The Scrap Metal Dealers Act of 2013 became law on February 28, 2013.112 Many 
provisions of the new law were created as a direct result of the success of the National 
Metal Task Force and Operation Tornado. Provisions directly related to Operation 
Tornado included the following: 
1 (1) No person may carry on business as a scrap metal dealer unless 
authorized by a licence under this Act (a “scrap metal license”) 
2 (1) A scrap metal licence is to be issued by a local authority11 (1) A 
scrap metal dealer must not receive scrap metal from a person without 
verifying the person’s full name and address.  
11 (2) That verification must be by reference to documents, data or other 
information obtained from a reliable and independent source.  
12 (1) A scrap metal dealer must not pay for scrap metal except— 
(a) by a cheque with under section 81A of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1882 is nottransferable, or 
(b) by an electronic transfer of funds (authorized by credit or debit 
card or otherwise).113 
The last provision of the bill is perhaps the most impactful portion of the legislation.  
As a result of the last provision, scrap dealers would no longer be allowed to pay 
for scrap metal with cash payments. Instead, all transactions how must occur by either 
check or electronic transfer, ensuring a permanent record of the transaction. Stolen scrap 
metal sold to a licensed dealer could therefore be easily traced by law enforcement 
officials viewing the recorded identify of the seller, as well as tracing the financial 
transaction.  
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F. WERE ENFORCEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS SUCCESSFUL? 
The United Kingdom, like many other nations, had tried unsuccessfully for years 
to combat rising incidents involving metal theft with standard law enforcement tactics. 
Between 2006 and 2011, while traditional law enforcement methods were embraced, 
metal theft reports continued to rise. Between 2009 and 2011 in England and Wales 
reported metal theft incidents increased nearly 300 percent.114 Clearly law enforcement 
efforts, including Operation Fragment, had no impact on reducing metal theft, in spite of 
a substantial amount of arrests (314 prosecutions in 2011).115 
The tide began to turn beginning with Operation Tornado in 2012. Official data 
compiled by the Home Office and derived from reports from the Energy Networks 
Association, internal Home Office data, and the British Transport Police shows a marked 
reduction in incidents of reported metal theft. Table 2 illustrates the reduction of reported 
incidents nationwide from a peak in mid-2011 to the end of calendar year 2013.  
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Table 2.   Recorded Incidents of Metal Theft (UK) 
 
Source: Tackling Metal Theft: Briefing from the LGA for Prospective Police and Crime 
Commissioners,” Local Government Association.  
Further data, derived solely from England and Wales show a corresponding 
marked reduction in metal theft incidents between 2012/13 and 2013/14, as seen in  
Table 3.  
Table 3.   Metal Theft Offences (UK) 
 
Source: “Tackling Metal Theft: Briefing from the LGA for Prospective Police and Crime 
Commissioners,” Local Government Association, 9.  
 
 48 
Data compiled by the Home Office clearly demonstrates that the combined 
legislative and law enforcement tactics adopted in 2012 and early 2013 have had a 
significant impact on metal theft incidents within United Kingdom.  
G. CONCLUSION / ANALYSIS 
While the data from the United Kingdom is encouraging at first glance, it is 
critically important to further analyze the reported trends and to examine whether or not 
the programs utilized in the United Kingdom would have any relevant applicability 
within the United States. In the analysis section of this thesis, the programs and initiatives 
utilized in the nation are evaluated based on the metrics developed in the methodology 
section. Using the developed metrics allows the successes or failures of the United 
Kingdom to be compared to the other two sample nations. Prior to the comparative 
analysis, however, the individual efforts of the United Kingdom must be evaluated based 
on the metrics developed for this thesis.  
On the first metric, which evaluates the nation’s efforts with respect to the 
regulation of the scrap industry, the United Kingdom scores a ranking of five. The 
passage of the Scrap Metal Dealer’s Act in 2013 resulted in heavy regulation of the legal 
scrap trade and a measurable reduction in thefts occurred throughout the nation following 
its implementation.  
With respect to the second metric, an evaluation of legal changes to criminal 
statutes, the United Kingdom scores a ranking of one due to a lack of legislative 
proposals related to enhanced penalties. The government of the United Kingdom focused 
the bulk of its efforts on regulation of the scrap industry and did not make any effort to 
enhance criminal penalties for those convicted of stealing copper wire. Instead, 
legislative changes related to criminal penalties were developed for licensed dealers that 
violated codified regulations.  
The United Kingdom scores a rating of five on the third metric, which evaluates 
the level of changes to the criminal justice strategy within the nation. The nation made 
multiple changes to its strategy as copper theft incidents continued to rise. Realizing that 
a local approach was ineffective, the government turned to the British Transport Police to 
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centralize all copper theft operations. The centralization of operations was the key to 
developing new and innovative approaches to attack the problem. In addition, 
centralization also afforded the country the opportunity to have a unified voice in 
international operations. The United Kingdom was one of the initial participants in the 
European Union’s Pol-Primett program, and the British Transport Police became heavily 
engaged multinational operations designed to combat cross-border, organized crime 
activities.  
On the final metric, the demonstration of a measurable reduction in copper theft 
incidents, the United Kingdom also scores a rating of five. Any critical analysis of the 
United Kingdom’s apparent success must include a comparison of theft incidents with the 
open market copper price index to account for any price fluctuations that could have 
influenced the statistics. The British Home Office produced a research report examining 
the linkage between copper prices and copper theft. The results, shown Figure 4, are very 
encouraging.  
Figure 4.  Copper Price Index/Crime Comparison 
 




Data derived from the Energy Networks Association related to metal theft 
incidents and from letscrecyle.com related to copper theft price indexes shows that 
copper prices have been relatively stagnant since early 2010. In spite of the stagnation of 
prices, metal theft incidents clearly decreased following the implementation of Operation 
Tornado in early 2012. This was followed by a further decrease after the implementation 
of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act of 2013.  
Operation Tornado was not successful solely because of enhanced enforcement 
efforts. If enhanced enforcement and investigation tactics were effective by themselves, 
then earlier operations, such as Operation Fragment, would have been more successful. 
The success of Operation Tornado was related specifically to the requirement that all 
sellers had to present identification and dealers had to keep comprehensive records of all 
transactions. Operation Tornado’s success led to the cashless system of transactions, 
which greatly reduced metal theft incidents.  
There is ample empirical evidence available to show that the programs and 
strategies initiated in the United Kingdom have resulted in significant reductions in theft 
incidents, independent of fluctuations in the copper commodity price index. As a whole 
the United Kingdom scores a rating of 16out of a possible 20points on the rating scale 
developed for this examination. The bulk of the United Kingdom’s success lies within its 
successful implementation of a cashless transaction system for scrap metal. However, the 
United Kingdom was not the first nation to experiment with a cashless transaction 
system. The first nation that passed comprehensive legislative reform of the scrap 










Situated on the mainland of Europe, France has long struggled with copper and 
scrap metal theft. While England’s steps to combat the problem with new operations and 
legislation took off in the beginning of 2012, France passed new regulations and 
legislation regulating the scrap metal industry in 2010 after a decade of expanded law 
enforcement efforts. As with the United Kingdom, a detailed examination of France’s 
efforts in the fight against copper theft is necessary in order to determine a viable course 
for the United States. The detailed examination of France in this chapter is similar to 
examination in the previous chapter of the United Kingdom. It includes a brief 
introduction, background the problem to date, a definition of what constitutes critical 
infrastructure in France, an identification of relevant stakeholders, followed by an 
examination of regulatory and enforcement efforts to date, and concluding with a results 
section.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Copper thieves have long targeted infrastructure within France, although 
measuring the exact extent of the problem is quite difficult. Statistics related to criminal 
activity are maintained in the French Ministry of Justice and do not differentiate copper 
theft from the many other types of larcenies that occur throughout the country. As 
opposed to in the United Kingdom, there are no independent statistics related to wire 
theft maintained by any of the various industrial associations. The only meaningful 
statistics related to copper wire theft are maintained within the law enforcement 
community and are difficult to verify independently.  
As with the United Kingdom, in France, there are ample news reports and 
anecdotal industry reports that demonstrate the sheer depth of the copper theft problem. 
Metal thieves are indiscriminate in their targeting of buildings and facilities that contain 
copper wire. For example, in May of 2014, metal thieves scaled over 20wind turbines in 
the French countryside, broke into the engine compartments, and made off with the bulk 
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of the copper wiring rendering each of the turbines inoperable.116 Electrical infrastructure 
is, of course, not the only kind of infrastructure targeted by copper thieves.  
Rail lines in France have been repeatedly targeted by copper thieves. The national 
railroad of France states that in 2011, there were nearly eight wire theft incidents a day 
that ultimately cost approximately $45,000 USC to repair.117 In addition to the substantial 
costs of repairing damaged equipment, the railroad also reported approximately 6,000 
hours in train delays during calendar year 2011.118 Aside from the financial costs 
associated with damage to structure, copper thieves also put the traveling public at great 
risk when they steal copper cabling from essential safety components, such as signaling 
mechanisms. One theft of 800 meters of signaling cable in central France in 2011 resulted 
in significant speed restrictions and stop orders for the country’s premier TGV high-
speed service.119 
Aside from rail lines and wind turbines, thieves have also aggressively targeted 
various other parts of France’s critical infrastructure. Attacks have targeted various 
components of the electrical grid, as evidenced by a case in 2010 when a suspected 
copper thief was found dead at the bottom of an electrical grid pylon after being 
electrocuted while attempting to cut wire.120 Metal thieves in France operate as organized 
gangs and are not only well skilled, but also properly equipped to dismantle active power 
lines and electrical substations.121 In addition to the electrical grid, thieves have had past 
success disrupting the telecommunications network within the country. In 2006, thieves 
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stole 550 meters of copper cable from France Telecomm, resulting in lengthy phone and 
Internet outages to two different cities.122 In France, every aspect of critical infrastructure 
has been impacted by copper wire theft in recent years.  
C. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Critical infrastructure in France refers to those pieces of infrastructure that: 
Provide an essential support for economic and social well-being, for 
public safety and for the functioning of key government responsibilities, 
such that disruption or destruction of the infrastructure would result in 
catastrophic and far-reaching damage.123 
The government of France defines critical infrastructure in its country within seven 
categories: food, water, energy, transport, financial institutions, information and 
communication systems, and command and decision centers.124 Any facility operating 
within those loosely defined categories is considered to be a part of the country’s critical 
infrastructure.  
As with the United Kingdom, in France, each sector denoted by the government 
as critical infrastructure is vulnerable to the threat of copper wire theft. As noted earlier, 
thieves often target the transportation sector, causing millions of dollars of damage each 
year. In addition to the real financial costs of repairing damaged facilities, the reality is 
that transportation services are greatly disrupted by wire thieves. In 2011, there were over 
5,800 hours of recorded delays in France related specifically to copper wire theft 
incidents.125 
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D. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
France has a variety of stakeholders who have a vested interest in attacking the 
problems associated with copper wire theft throughout the nation. First and foremost are 
the country’s law enforcement components. Law enforcement in France is comprised of 
three primary types of forces: the National Police, the Gendarmerie de Nationale, and a 
variety of local police forces that serve under the authority of local elected officials.126 
Policing in France is highly centralized and the two agencies with the most power and 
impact on criminal activities are the National Police and the Gendarmerie, which is 
actually part of the military structure within the country.127 The Gendarmerie is a large 
force with a national footprint and, as such, is the agency that has been charged with 
combating serious crimes on a national level.128 As the copper theft epidemic exploded in 
Europe in the early part of the twenty-first century, the Gendarmerie was designated the 
lead agency to combat the problem, in part due to its experience in working in multi-
national task forces, as well as its extensive intelligence apparatus.129 
As with the United Kingdom, there are a variety of corporate entities that have a 
vested interest in the copper wire trade. In 1988, it was estimated that over 2,700 firms 
were involved in the scrap recycling business in France, with revenues exceeding $6 
billon U. S. dollars per year.130 Corporate scrap entities vary from tiny businesses tucked 
into French villages to the massive Compagnie Francaise des Ferrailles (CFF), which is 
based in Paris and controls roughly 35 percent of the ferrous scrap market.131 
There are a variety of industrial trade associations representing the scrap dealers 
in France. The primary trade association in France is the French Federation of Recycling 
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Enterprises (FEDEREC).132 The association is extremely powerful within the country and 
recently aligned itself with the European Recycling Industries’ Confederation (EuRIC), 
which exerts influence throughout the European Union on matters associated with the 
industry at large.133 
Aside from the law enforcement and industrial entities, the French government is 
the largest stakeholder in the fight against the illicit copper wire trade. In addition, the 
French government has direct control over the railway systems located throughout the 
country through its ownership of the French national railway system, the French National 
Railway (SNCF). The SNCF maintains and monitors approximately 30,000 kilometers of 
railroad tracks throughout France and provides passenger service to approximately 130 
million individuals per year.134 
In addition to its control over the transportation system, the French government 
also exerts significant control over the energy market. The distribution of electricity and 
gas throughout the country has been historically supplied by the Electricite de France 
corporation, and by law, the government holds at least 70 per cent of the capital and 
voting rights of it.135 Though France’s entry in the European Union caused it to pass 
legislation allowing the entry of private energy companies into the nation, the bulk of 
utilities within France are still heavily controlled by government ownership and 
regulation.136 As such, the government of France is extremely interested in developing 
ways to stem the rising tide of copper thefts that directly affect power generation and 
service dissemination throughout the country.  
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E. INTERDICTION, REGULATORY, AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
The French response to the rising number of copper wire thefts within their nation 
has been varied, relying on a combination of legislative, regulatory, and formal 
enforcement methods. Due to its location on the main body of continental Europe, France 
has had to account for metal thieves crossing its borders on a regular basis and operating 
as part of large continental organized crime organizations.  
Initially, as copper prices soared in the mid-2000s, the French undertook a series 
of coordinated criminal interdiction efforts coupled with new physical security methods. 
In order to deter the copper wire thieves that attacked railroad infrastructure, the SNCF 
contracted with the Gendarmerie to provide aerial helicopter patrols, complete with high 
tech thermal imaging, over its railroad tracks and facilities.137 The helicopter patrols were 
also designed to monitor electrical lines in addition to railroad property. Moreover, in 
addition to helicopter patrols, SNCF also invested heavily in new technology designed to 
thwart copper wire thieves. For instance, SNCF has purchased a sophisticated electronic 
warning system designed to notify the railroad immediately of a theft, while also alerting 
the police.138 
While physical security enhancements were implemented, the French government 
also undertook a variety of law enforcement initiatives. As referenced earlier, the 
Gendarmerie was designated by the government as the primary lead agency to handle all 
major metal theft incidents throughout the country. The Gendarmerie operates its cable 
theft operations through its Central Office for Combating Mobile Criminality 
(OCLDI).139 In June of 2014, the Gendarmerie participated in Operation Capalest, 
resulting in the arrest of 10 leaders of an organized crime operation in Moldova who were 
responsible for numerous theft incidents in France.140 The arrests highlight the difficult 
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nature of enforcement efforts, as items were stolen in France and were then transported 
by minibus to Moldova for resale.  
The Gendarmerie has worked frequently with international law enforcement 
organizations to effect arrests related to scrap metal theft and are heavily involved with 
Europol, Interpol, and Railpol. In early 2013, Gendarmerie officers participated in an 
operation netting the arrest of multiple individuals in various countries, while seizing 
approximately 120 tons of stolen copper.141 The complicated nature of the operation, as 
well as the fact that arrests occurred in multiple nations, highlighted the reality that stolen 
scrap is often moved from one country to another.142 
In addition to physical security and law enforcement activities, the French 
government radically changed laws and regulations with respect to the scrap industry 
beginning in 2010. In 2010, the French government amended legislation regulating the 
scrap recycling industry. The French legislation includes the following language: 
Article L112-6 
Any transaction on the retail purchase of ferrous and non ferrous metal is 
made by crossed check, bank or postal transfer, or by credit transaction 
may not exceed a ceiling set by decree. Failure to comply with this 
requirement is punishable by a ticket for the fifth class.  
II. -I Notwithstanding, the costs of the department conceded that exceed 
the sum of 450 Euros must be paid by bank transfer.143 
The legislation had the effect of eliminating any cash transactions for copper or other 
scrap metal of value greater than $600 U. S. dollars.144 As in the United Kingdom, no 
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longer could criminal actors in France receive cash payments from scrap dealers for large 
amounts of copper or scrap metal.  
The French government amended the language of the legislation even further in 
2011, eliminating cash transactions from dealers for any scrap metal.145 Estimates from 
government and law enforcement experts noted that approximately 80 percent of all 
payments for scrap metal in France were made in cash prior to the legislation becoming 
effective.146 
The final piece of the French legislative and regulatory approach to scrap metal 
theft was the imposition of strict regulations on licensed scrap dealers operating within 
the country. All scrap dealers are required to maintain a record of all scrap materials 
purchased, including a description of the item, and a copy of the seller’s identification.147 
The dealers are now required to maintain the records for a period of five years, and any 
violation of the law results in serious criminal penalties including prison time, and heavy 
monetary fines.148 
F. RESULTS 
Due to the lack of statistics specifically related to metal theft offenses within 
France, it is difficult to accurately determine whether or not the legislative and 
enforcement efforts have been successful at creating an overall reduction in incidents of 
metal theft. While statistics are not readily available, the Gendarmerie Nationale’s 
Central Office for Combating Mobile Criminality has reported a significant reduction in 
metal thefts in calendar year 2012 following the imposition the new laws and 
regulations.149 The Gendarmerie has also self-reported that scrap dealers have been 
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generally compliant with the new regulations and that has caused the resultant reduction 
in metal theft incidents.  
Perhaps another indicator of the success of the new regulations is a little 
publicized partnership between FEDEREC and the Gendarmerie. At the behest of the 
French government, the two parties created a joint alert system that relays metal theft 
alerts between the French Home Office and licensed scrap dealers. The open exchange of 
information resulted in a steady of alerts for metal theft over the first six months of 
2012.150 
G. CONCLUSION / ANALYSIS 
Without direct statistical evidence, it is difficult to accurately judge the success of 
the French efforts against metal theft. Judging the initiatives based solely on the 
Gendarmerie reports, it appears that efforts have been successful overall. A critical 
evaluation, based on the metrics specified in the methodology section, depicts a nation 
that has had moderate success in the fight against copper fight.  
France, as noted earlier, was the first of the three nations analyzed that has had 
success in increasing regulation of the scrap dealer trade. With respect to the first metric, 
evaluating the regulation of the scrap recycling industry, France scores a rating of four. 
France has been able to effectively gain legislative approval for enhanced regulation of 
the scrap trade, including the implementation of a cashless transaction system that has 
changed over time from a system limiting amounts paid in cash to a system that 
completely banned cash transactions. Furthermore, the French government also instituted 
harsh penalties for those dealers found in violation of the enhanced legislation.  
France does not receive the full score of five on the rating scale due to anecdotal 
reports that the legislation has had little real effect on the overall crime rate as cross 
border raids continue to occur. In one interview, a member of a recycling industry 
association stated his belief that the cash ban did not result in an overall drop in theft 
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incidents simply because stolen material was sent to other countries instead of being 
resold at licensed scrap dealers.151 
The second metric used in this study concerns an evaluation of legal changes 
related to criminal statutes. In this category, France’s efforts rate a one on the scale as it 
has achieved no real success in creating enhanced penalties for those individuals 
convicted of stealing copper wire. Furthermore, the legislature within France has not even 
proposed enhancements aimed at increasing the penalties associated with copper theft.  
On the third metric, which rates changes made within the criminal justice 
enterprise within the nation, France scores a rating of a rating of five. While some of the 
local agencies and the French National Police have continued to pursue operations 
against copper thieves, France has consolidated the bulk of copper theft operations under 
the paramilitary Gendarmerie de Nationale. As a result, the government has been able to 
effectively centralize operations under one umbrella, leading to better coordination 
during cross-border operations and the creation of a specific intelligence office that has 
the ability to compile and analyze statistics specifically related to copper theft. In an area 
of intelligence-led policing, France has taken the lead by using a specific component 
within the Gendarmerie to direct law enforcement assets to problem locations in a more 
timely fashion than any past efforts.  
The final metric, which evaluates the overall reduction in copper theft incidents, is 
difficult to judge within France because of the lack of verifiable statistics related to the 
crime. Based solely on self-reports from the Gendarmerie, the efforts of the French 
government in this category produce a score of three. The government has reported a 
reduction in overall incidents following the implementation of new regulations and law 
enforcement strategies, but there is no way to quantify a reduction of more than 50 
percent without empirical evidence.  
Overall, the rating achieved by France on the defined metrics scale is a total of 13, 
which is lower than the score associated with the United Kingdom, primarily because of 
                                                 
151 Andrew Hough, “£5bn Scrap Metal Industry Told to ‘Clean up Act over Thefts Crime Wave,’” The 
Telegraph, January 6, 2012, accessed September 3, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/ 
8994797/5bn-scrap-metal-industry-told-to-clean-up-act-over-thefts-crime-wave.html.  
 61 
the lack of verifiable statistics related to copper theft incidents within the nation. It does 
appear, however, that cashless scrap metal policies have had an effect on the illicit copper 
theft trade in both the United Kingdom and France—notwithstanding the anecdotal 
evidence of cross border theft issues in France. Other nations have not been successful at 
passing “cashless” trade legislation and regulation and instead have focused on more 
traditional methods to combat the problem. Italy, in particular, has been at the forefront 
of the metal theft fight since the copper prices began to soar in the early part of the 












While also situated on the mainland of continental Europe, Italy’s experience with 
the copper wire theft epidemic has differed significantly from France. The enforcement 
and regulatory efforts attempted within Italy have also been very different from those 
utilized in the United Kingdom. The bulk of enforcement efforts within the United 
Kingdom and France have been aimed at eliminating the ability of criminals to obtain 
large sums of money within their borders for scrap metal.  
In Italy, the copper theft epidemic is generally related to complex cross-border 
operations operated by sophisticated organized crime networks.152 Italy’s position on the 
continent of Europe places it much closer to former Soviet satellite nations than the 
United Kingdom or France. Organized crime in the former Soviet Eastern Bloc nations 
exploded after the revolutions of 1989, particularly in nations such as Hungary and the 
countries that formerly made up Czechoslovakia.153 The proximity of the Eastern Block 
organized crime gangs in relation to Italy makes copper in Italy a far easier target than 
undertaking longer journeys to France or across the English Channel into the United 
Kingdom. As such, Italy’s reaction to the epidemic has been far different from its 
European allies.  
This chapter provides a background of the extent of the problem in Italy, 
identification of critical infrastructure and those stakeholders within the country that have 
an interest in copper theft operations, as well as an identification of the regulatory and 
enforcement methods used by Italian authorities, followed by a review of the results of 
those operations, and a brief analysis of the overall effect of enforcement methods.  
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Italy as a nation historically has been a heavy consumer of copper and in 2013 
was listed as the sixth largest consumer of copper in the world.154 Copper is a scare 
commodity within Italy and a product that is heavily sought after by criminals operating 
on the black market. Italy’s consumption of copper is significantly higher than the United 
Kingdom or France; neither of those two nation’s status lies within the top 10 of copper 
consumers in the world, as does Italy.155 Italy is not a major producer of copper, and as a 
result, the nation focuses heavily on recycled copper to satisfy its significant demand for 
the product.156 
Between 2009 and 2011, research by Pol-Primett estimated that incidents of 
copper theft increased by approximately 70 percent.157The corresponding price of copper 
during that time rose approximately 200 percent from a price of approximately $3,000 
USC per ton in 2009 to approximately $9,000 USC in 2011.158 The significant increase in 
the price of copper likely drove the corresponding spike in the theft of copper from 
facilities throughout Italy. Unfortunately, there is no public clearinghouse or statistical 
data that relate specifically to copper and scrap metal theft, so all statistics for Italy are 
compiled from reports issued by various stakeholders.  
As with other European countries, one of the industries hardest hit by copper 
thieves in Italy is the transportation industry. In 2010, the national railways of Italy 
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reported nearly 45,000 minutes of delays associated with copper wire theft incidents.159 
The number of theft incidents related to railroad property within Italy is staggering. In 
2012, the state railroad of Italy reported 2137 incidents, followed by 2056 incidents in 
2013, and a projected number of 2140 in 2014.160 Each separate incident has the potential 
to cause major disruptions to the entire railroad system within the country as well as 
endangering the lives of the traveling public. In addition to railroad property located in 
sparsely populated areas in the countryside, thieves have also brazenly targeted large 
stations in populated city centers. In one attack in January of 2011, thieves stole safety 
wiring from a station in Rome, causing nearly six hours of delays during the morning 
rush hour.161 
Other utilities have also been repeatedly targeted by copper thieves in Italy. In 
June of 2013, Italian police arrested a Romanian citizen who was caught with nearly a ton 
of telephone wire in the trunk of his vehicle.162 Damage to the telecommunications 
systems in the country not only disrupts business and personal endeavors, but it also 
greatly effects public safety as first responders do not receive calls as a result of damaged 
phone and Internet lines. In one location in southern Italy in 2010, the nation’s primary 
phone service provider, Telecom Italia, reported a total of 38 incidents of theft totaling 
over 45 kilometers of copper cable stolen, resulting in numerous and prolonged service 
disruptions.163 
The electrical grid in Italy has also suffered greatly at the hands of copper thieves 
within Italy. In calendar year 2010, for instance, one of the nation’s largest electricity 
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providers, Enel, reported a total of 2,189 copper incidents resulting in monetary damages 
of approximately $17 million U. S. dollars.164 Newspapers articles and governmental 
publications are littered with anecdotal stories about theft from the electrical grid, 
including graphic descriptions of offenders electrocuted while attempting to steal copper 
from live wires.  
C. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
As opposed to many other European Union nations, Italy has not passed any 
formal legislation or issued any governmental decrees specifically declaring what defines 
critical infrastructure within the country. While there has been no official governmental 
declaration, various publications and agreements with the European Union have produced 
a snapshot of what constitutes critical infrastructure within the nation. Those categories 
include banking and finance, public safety and order, telecommunications, emergency 
services, energy production, public administration, health care, transportation, and 
defense structures.165 
While Italy has not taken steps to formalize its definition of critical infrastructure 
assets, the nation is an active member of the European Union whose charter defines 
critical infrastructure for member nations as  
an asset, system or part thereof located in member states which is essential 
for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, 
economic or social wellbeing of people, and the disruption or destruction 
of which would have a significant impact in a member state as a result of 
the failure to maintain those functions.166  
Within those identified areas, there is a broad array of stakeholders that have a significant 
interest in mitigating the destabilizing and damaging consequences associated with 
copper wire theft.  
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D. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
In Italy, the most important stakeholder in the fight against metal theft is the law 
enforcement community. Law enforcement operations in Italy are controlled at the 
national level and dictated by the constitution, which decrees that the government has 
strict control over matters concerning state security, ammunition, and explosives.167 The 
specific role of law enforcement is handled by four distinct entities: the National Police, 
the Carabinieri, the Financial Crime Investigation Unit, and the Penitentiary Police 
Corps.168 Determining which part of the law enforcement community that deals 
specifically with wire and copper theft is complicated by the structure of policing in Italy.  
The National Police have specialty services that enforce matters related to 
highways, railroads, and telecommunications while the Carabinieri have its own special 
operations divisions that handle economically sensitive issues such as large-scale 
organized crime operations.169 Further complicating jurisdictional issues is the reality that 
the Financial Crime Investigation Unit is specifically charged with enforcement related to 
smuggling operations and organized crime.170 Not surprisingly, it is well known that the 
National Police and the Carabinieri have been engaged jurisdictional battles for over a 
hundred years to determine which has primary authority in a variety of situations.171 
Therefore, enforcement efforts are heavily impacted by a determination of which sector 
of infrastructure has been victimized by copper thieves.  
The railroad sector, though also operated solely as a state run function, is far less 
complicated than the law enforcement sector. Within Italy, the primary stakeholder 
concerned with the protection of railroads is the Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI), which is 
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the state-run body charged with the overall care of the entire Italian railway network.172 
While the RFI is responsible for the infrastructure within Italy, the primary operating 
company is Trenitalia, which like the RFI is owned by the government under the broad 
railroad holding corporation known as Ferroviedello Stato Italiane (FSI).173 Utilizing its 
subsidiaries, the FSI is responsible for operating and maintaining approximately 16,000 
kilometers of railroad throughout Italy. To police the railroad, the National Police created 
the Italian Railway Police (POLFER) unit in 1920 specifically to protect the trains, 
passengers, and properties of the state run railroads.174 
The segment of the telecommunications industry that is most affected by copper 
wire theft is the hard line structure utilized by traditional telephonic systems and the 
cabling structure that supports Internet connectivity throughout the nation. The primary 
stakeholder in the telecommunications field is Telecom Italia, formed as the result of a 
merger of five state run holding companies dating back to the Mussolini government.175 
Over the past 14 years, the telecommunications industry in Italy has become more open 
to private enterprise, and the Telefonica corporation operates in direct competition with 
Telecom Italia, as well as being a minority shareholder in Telecom Italia.176 Telecom 
Italia and Telefonica have both been hard hit by copper thieves in recent years and have 
sought ways to reduce damages and operating outages.  
While the railroad industry and telecommunications industries have not been 
significantly impacted by deregulation, the energy market has been heavily impacted. 
The major power distributors in Italy are all operated by private entities. There are four 
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main service providers operating in the country: Enel, Edison, E. On, and Edipower.177 
Each of the providers has been adversely affected by copper thieves and has suffered 
extensive financial losses and prolonged power outages due to theft incidents from the 
electrical grid as well as company facilities. As noted earlier, Enel reported 2189 theft 
incidents in 2010, which accounted for only one quarter of reported incidents from the 
four major corporations. The high voltage grid and transmission lines are owned almost 
exclusively by the TernaSpA corporation, a company that is controlled by the Italian 
government.178 Therefore, the Italian government continues to have a strong interest in 
maintaining the electrical grid and preventing large-scale copper theft.  
Aside from government entities and the transportation and electrical service 
providers, the other primary stakeholders in the fight against copper theft in Italy are 
those businesses that work in the scrap metal industry. Businesses that work in the scrap 
metal industry are generally represented by the ASSOFERMET association, which 
represents approximately 1100 corporations, 600 of which have reported being actively 
involved in the scrap metal trade.179 Due to the overall size of the scrap recycling 
industry within Italy, the ASSOFERMET association holds considerable political sway 
and influence with the Italian government and has the ability to change the course of any 
legislation related to regulation of the industry.  
E. INTERDICTION, REGULATORY, AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Italy has not embraced sweeping 
legislative and regulatory reform to address the copper theft epidemic. Instead, Italy has 
instead relied on traditional enforcement methods and enhanced collaboration between 
the various stakeholders interested in reducing the volume of incidents occurring 
throughout the country.  
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Law enforcement operations within Italy have generally consisted of three 
different levels of operations. The first level focuses on action against individual 
offenders and organized crime groups, the second level on detecting black market 
handling channels, and the third on detecting illegally export channels.180 To operate 
effectively in all three levels, every organization within the Italian law enforcement 
apparatus must cooperate with its sister organizations. As noted previously before, 
cooperation has been difficult between some of the agencies due to longstanding 
rivalries, which ultimately has a negative effect on the overall impact of enforcement 
operations.  
There are three interconnected operations that targeted metal thieves suspected of 
targeting the Italian Railway network and are illustrative of operational success when 
agencies actually cooperated. The operation, known as Cuprum Novum (A New Copper), 
targeted both the individuals responsible for stealing the copper as well as the companies 
responsible for the purchase of stolen goods.181 Working in unison, Italian law 
enforcement agencies were able to determine that two companies encouraged an 
organized crime group with origins in Romania to steal scrap from the Italian Railway 
network for eventual resale.182 Following a series of wire-taps, Italian authorities 
determined that the businesses assured the group that any copper stolen from the railroad 
would be cut to hide any distinguishing features, thereby greatly reducing the likelihood 
of arrest and eventual prosecution.183 
Law enforcement operations, such as Cuprum Novum, are the primary tool used 
by the Italian government to attempt to stem the tide of wire theft within its nation. 
Unfortunately, statistics from the railroad industry alone show that law enforcement 
operations have had little effect as a meaningful deterrent for copper theft operations. In 
2009 and 2010, the rail network reported losses each year related to wire theft of over 10 
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million Euros, a significant increase over losses from earlier years when law enforcement 
operations began to take shape.184 
In an effort to stem the tide of copper theft, the Italian legislature undertook 
discussion of various reform bills. Due to extensive political disagreements, the 
legislature was only able to pass legislation amending the criminal code in 2012 to add 
aggravating circumstances to any theft found to involve scrap metal. The legislation 
specifically added stronger penalties for any offense deemed to be linked to the theft and 
the “handling and receiving of copper, metal components or other material stolen from 
infrastructures for power supply, transport, telecommunications, or other public services 
which are managed by public/private entities under public concession schemes.”185 
Specific penalties were not stipulated in the legislation, however, and adjudication was 
left to local courts to determine.  
Aside from traditional law enforcement efforts and minimal legislative changes, 
the Italian government did develop an innovative and collaborative program consisting of 
a variety of the primary stakeholders in the effort to curb copper theft. In 2012, the 
Minister of the Interior established the National Monitoring Centre on Copper Theft, 
designed to enhance cooperation between law enforcement entities and the companies 
most directly exposed to copper theft.186 The center was initially established in 2012 and 
included the following members: The Minister of the Interior (representing the National 
Police and the Carabinieri), the Italian Customs Agency, FrroviedelloStatoItaliane, 
EnelSpA, Telecom Italia, and the ANIE Federation.187 Aside from monitoring incidents 
of copper theft, the group’s charter also charged it with proposing strategies to prevent 
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and fight the crime, as well as with proposing new legislation or amendments to existing 
legislation.188 
Perhaps the most unique part of the monitoring center’s charter is the call for the 
group to develop and promote advertising campaigns to raise public awareness of the 
seriousness of the metal theft phenomenon.189 One of the problems noted repeatedly 
within many countries affected by copper theft is the general lack of knowledge about the 
seriousness of the problem by politicians and the general public. With a charge to create 
advertising campaigns, it appears the Italian government has created a mechanism to 
increase awareness in order to effect change within its own legislature and public.  
F. RESULTS 
In spite of the uniqueness of the National Monitoring Centre, the enhanced 
legislation and continued law enforcement efforts, it appears that the various stakeholders 
in Italy have had very little success at reducing the amount of metal theft within the 
country. Table 4 shows the clear rise of copper theft incidents within Italy prior to the 
creation of the National Monitoring Centre.  
Table 4.   Italian Copper Theft Incidents 
 
Source: Pol-Primett, Findings of Pol-Primett Research Activities.  
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As noted in Table 4, reported theft incidents related to copper wire grew steadily 
from 2009 through 2012, the year of the creation of the National Monitoring Centre. 
Clearly, the Italian government hoped the center would provide a mechanism to reduce 
incidents throughout the country.  
Unfortunately, statistical evidence obtained from the FerrovieDelloStatoItaliane 
regarding railway thefts (illustrated in Figure 5) indicates that none of the aforementioned 
programs, including the National Monitoring Centre, have had any real effect on the 
copper theft epidemic.  
Figure 5.  Copper Thefts on Railroad Property 
 
 
Source: Delfini, “Italian Enforcement Activities.” 
As noted from the evidence above (Figure 5), the statistical trend line for reported 
copper theft incidents against railroad property has not significantly changed from 
January of 2012 through March 2014. While there were some notable decreases in 2013, 
including only 96 offenses in December of 2013, the overall trend still suggests that the 
programs have not had any meaningful impact on reducing incidents of copper theft.  
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G. CONCLUSION / ANALYSIS 
The Italian experience with copper theft has been very different from that of the 
United Kingdom and France. In spite of an ever-growing number of copper theft 
incidents, the Italians have failed to settle on a unified approach to the problem and 
continue to be plagued by significant theft incidents instigated by organized crime 
elements within its nation and from the former Eastern Block nations. When measured 
against the defined metrics of this project, it is clear to see that the Italians have failed at 
virtually every measurable metric that defines success in the fight against copper theft.  
On the first metric, which measures the enhancement of regulation related to the 
scrap recycling industry, Italian efforts result in a rating of two. There have been many 
legislative proposals; however, none has advanced to a vote within Italian parliament, and 
no proposal has achieved the necessary acceptance of all relevant stakeholders to 
shepherd it through the legislative process.  
With respect to the creation of enhanced criminal statutes, the second metric, 
Italy’s efforts have resulted in a rating of three. Italy has proposed and passed significant 
criminal statutes that increase the penalties associated with those convicted of copper 
wire offenses within their borders. Italy’s score within this metric is not higher simply 
because the approved federal legislation is often ignored by various elements within the 
Italian judiciary, particularly those in areas typically associated with organized crime, 
such as Sicily. In order to achieve a higher score, Italy would have had to ensure that the 
legislation was not only approved but that it was universally adhered to throughout the 
nation and resulted in a documented reduction in the level of theft incidents in every 
region.  
Italy also receives a mediocre score on the third metric, which measures changes 
in the criminal justice strategy related to the copper theft epidemic. Italy did succeed in 
the creation of a National Monitoring Centre, responsible for tracking theft incidents, 
which raised its score within the metric to a rating of three. To date, Italy has failed to 
resolve a century old feud between its two primary national police forces, and as a result 
it has been unable to develop a comprehensive national strategy comprised of centralized 
 75 
enforcement operations. Italy instead relies on multiple agencies to attack the problem, 
and each agency represents itself in international operations rather than presenting a 
unified front to its international partners.  
On the final metric, which measures the overall reduction in copper theft incidents 
within its nation, Italy receives a net score of one. Italy has failed to achieve any 
measurable decline in copper thefts, and anecdotal evidence provided by a variety of 
stakeholders actually suggests that copper theft incidents have steadily risen in spite of 
the various programs and initiatives that have been tried within the country.  
The Italian efforts, while admirable, lacked the legislative strength of its 
counterparts in the United Kingdom and France. As a result, the overall score for Italy is 
the lowest of the three nations measured, with an overall net score of nine. Italian 
infrastructure continues to suffer at the hands of copper thieves, in spite of numerous law 
enforcement operations, the creation of the National Copper Theft Monitoring Centre and 
legislation that called for enhanced criminal penalties for those convicted of stealing 
copper.  
There are a variety of reasons why Italian efforts to curb incidents of copper theft 
within its border have failed. Unless Italy can find a constructive way to confront cross-
border organized crime, or craft new regulations on the scrap recycling industry, it does 
not appear that any of its efforts will be met with verifiable statistical success.  
Of the three countries reviewed, Italy has had the least measurable success at 
decreasing the amount of copper theft incidents in its borders. A review of all three 
nations examined, coupled with a review of past efforts in the United States should result 
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VI. ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The examinations of the methods utilized in the United Kingdom, France, and 
Italy in the previous three chapters have resulted in the identification of three varied 
approaches to the copper theft epidemic. The approaches, while each designed to combat 
the same problem, were unique in the manner in which they attacked the underlying 
copper theft dilemma. One nation, United Kingdom, relied on the abolishment of all cash 
transactions for scrap metal in addition to a fundamental change in law enforcement 
practices. Another nation, France, initially banned cash transactions over a specified 
monetary threshold prior to a full ban on cash transactions while also enacting increased 
criminal penalties for violations of the enhanced regulations imposed upon the scrap 
recycling industry. The third nation, Italy, did not pass any legislation specifically related 
to the scrap metal trade and instead focused its efforts on enforcing existing laws and 
passing legislation that imposed greater penalties for those convicted of scrap metal theft.  
This chapter also includes an examination of the practical applicability of each 
case study to the United States, including an analysis of whether or not any of the 
programs portrayed in the studies have been attempted in the United States, followed by 
an analysis of whether or not those efforts achieved any measurable success within U. S. 
borders. The analysis progresses from the country that demonstrated the least amount of 
measured success in reducing incidents of copper theft success to the country that 
demonstrated the most success.  
Each nation attempted a variety of different law enforcement methods before 
progressing to regulatory and legal changes. France and the United Kingdom were 
successful in passing enhanced regulatory and legal measures, while Italy has been 
unable to pass any comprehensive legislation and instead has continued to rely on law 
enforcement operations and criminal prosecutions as the main weapon in its fight.  
Ultimately, each country received an individual score based on the research 
design metrics for this study. Each nation was evaluated across four metrics: a review of 
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changes to regulatory measures related to the scrap recycling industry, an evaluation of 
legal measures designed to enhance criminal penalties for convicted copper thieves, a 
critique of changes in the national criminal justice strategy, and finally an overall 
evaluation of the net change in number of reported copper theft incidents based on the 
initiatives undertaken in each nation. The United Kingdom achieved the highest score 
with a rating of 16, followed by France with a rating of 13, with Italy scoring the lowest 
rating at a level of nine. A comparison of the scores of each nation show the direct 
linkage between its scores and the disparate methods it utilized to combat the copper theft 
epidemic.  
While it was necessary to individually rate each nation, it is also necessary to 
examine the wide variety of external factors and influences within each nation that may 
have contributed the overall success or failure of the nation to achieve positive results. 
Furthermore, it is also important to analyze whether or not those external influences 
rendered newly enhanced policies and regulations ineffective.  
B. THE MINIMALIST APPROACH—ITALY 
Of the three nations that were reviewed in this project, the effort undertaken by 
the Italian government could easily be described as the most minimalistic approach to 
solving the copper theft problem. A review of the efforts of the Italians revealed that they 
achieved moderate success in only two of the four metrics utilized in this thesis.  
Italy has not proposed nor passed any legislation mandating increased regulation 
on the scrap recycling industry and to date it has been unable to develop a comprehensive 
nationwide plan to attack the copper theft epidemic. Instead, Italy has relied on the 
passage of laws stipulating enhanced penalties for those convicted of copper wire theft. 
The Italian government did successfully create a public-private partnership that resulted 
in the creation of a National Monitoring Centre on Copper Theft, which was a positive 
change for law enforcement tactics and cooperation within the country. The results of the 
Italian approach are not encouraging; however, their inability to measurably reduce 
incidents of copper wire theft in their nation is the result of a wide variety of internal and 
external factors.  
 79 
The government of Italy does not maintain statistical data directly related to 
copper theft. As such, the metrics used to analyze the efforts of the Italian government in 
the case study were heavily reliant on statistics provided by those industries most directly 
affected by copper wire theft (energy corporations and the national railroad company) as 
well as anecdotal media reports. By either measure, the data demonstrated that Italian 
anti-copper theft efforts failed at reducing reported incidents of copper theft.  
In addition to data presented by the Italian state railroad corporation in the case 
study, which demonstrated that copper theft levels remained virtually unchanged since 
early 2012, anecdotal news stories captured data from the National Monitoring Centre 
showed an overall rise in copper theft incidents in Italy. Data from the center published in 
2013, a year after the center’s creation, showed a 41 percent rise in the amount of 
individuals detained by police forces in Italy between 2012 and 2013 for suspicion of 
copper theft.190 While it is encouraging to note that more individuals were detained in the 
year following the creation of the center, the rise in detentions likely corresponded to a 
rise in reported theft incidents.  
The data presented in the case study effectively demonstrated that Italian efforts 
to reduce incidents of copper wire theft have been an abject failure when compared to the 
United Kingdom and France. The cumulative failure to produce meaningful reductions is 
the result of a variety of factors including: the creation of weak criminal justice reform 
efforts undermined by local politics, the failure to enact legislation similar to their 
European Union nation counterparts, and the explosive growth of international organized 
crime in former Eastern Bloc nations. An analysis of each of those three factors 
demonstrates how they worked together to undermine Italian reform efforts.  
First and foremost, the enhanced penalties passed as the result of an amendment 
to the criminal code in 2012 have proven ineffective at reducing copper theft incidents in 
those areas most directly affected by the epidemic primarily because many local areas 
within Italy simply ignore federal legislation and operate as lawless autonomous regions. 
Italy has existed for much of its history as a country governed by local communities, and 
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the black market economy has thrived as federal legislation has rarely been recognized in 
large segments of the nation.191 
The ENEL Corporation’s record of metal theft incidents in Italy in 2010 revealed 
that the two regions with the highest number of reported copper theft incidents were 
Sicily and Puglia.192 Both regions have historically been associated with organized 
crime. In fact, a report issued by EuroPol in 2013 noted that organized crime outfits in 
both regions act as veritable shadow states exercising control over local governments and 
operating outside the bounds of federal authority.193 In areas heavily populated by 
organized crime elements enhanced criminal sanctions are generally rendered 
meaningless by criminal courts that tend to be packed with corrupt judges that slow down 
or completely obstruct investigations.194 The end result is that copper theft, and other 
crime, continues unabated in spite of enhanced penalty legislation.  
The failure to enact regulatory reform similar to that in other European nations 
was not the result of organized crime elements, however. Instead industrial elements, 
such as the various scrap recycling industry associations within the country, have fought 
and successfully lobbied to limit additional regulatory control over the businesses they 
represent. Government infighting and the ability to assemble effective parliamentary 
coalitions have also resulted in a situation where legislative efforts continually failed to 
gain positive traction.  
The legislative gridlock within Italy over the past 15 years has been highly 
publicized by news reports that even detail a fistfight between two lawmakers from the 
northern section of the country on the floor of parliament in 2011.195 The governments of 
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France and the United Kingdom were able to overcome considerable opposition and 
internal squabbling to pass meaningful regulatory reform measures that produced 
measurable reductions in copper theft. However, Italy was only able to pass laws 
enhancing criminal penalties and creating the National Monitoring Centre, neither 
initiative resulted in a measureable reduction in thefts.  
Aside from weak legislation and the internal problems associated with organized 
crime elements in the country, the failure of Italy to reduce copper theft incidents is also 
attributable to its positioning on the continent of Europe. Italian initiatives have been 
heavily undermined by cross-border theft operations perpetrated by organized crime 
gangs operating out of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and countries in the Balkan region. 
A study by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) found that Italian organized 
crime groups were particularly adept at forming partnerships with local criminal groups 
in the former communist bloc nations.196 
A map published by the FAS shows a diagram of smuggling routes for other illicit 
items including narcotics and stolen vehicles (see Figure 6). The map, published in 2000, 
pre-dated the explosion in copper theft incidents but serves as an illustration of just how 
pervasive potential copper smuggling routes are in and out of Italy to Eastern European 
countries.  
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Figure 6.  Balkan Smuggling Routes 
 
Source: “Smuggling Routes through the Balkans” [image], Federation of American 
Scientists, accessed November 18, 2015, http://fas. org/irp/threat/754791.gif.  
If one of the primary reasons that Italy has been unable to stem the rising tide of 
copper theft incidents is cross-border organized crime activities, how then has France, 
also a country on mainland continental Europe, been able to control its borders and report 
moderate success in the copper theft fight? 
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C. THE PROGRESSIVE APPROACH—FRANCE 
A comprehensive review of the French model reveals success in three of the four 
metrics. France, as opposed to Italy, has worked diligently with its law enforcement 
elements and the European Union to combat cross border theft operations. Combined 
with strong regulatory enhancements, France was able to report moderate success 
reducing copper theft at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century. A 
closer analysis of France’s efforts demonstrates how it was able to reduce cross border 
operations while also reducing the amount of internal thefts from critical infrastructure 
components throughout the country.  
France’s initial efforts to stem the flow of illegal copper by setting a monetary cap 
of $600. 00 for cash transactions in 2010 did little to reduce incidents in the country. In 
2010, following the passage of the legislation, the Gendarmerie and the National Police 
recorded a total of 11,564 incidents of metal theft throughout the country.197 Data 
recorded by the French Home Office showed that the amount of copper brought into 
French scrap dealers decreased by approximately 30 percent following the 2010 
legislation, but there is no evidence to show a reduction in the amount of reported theft 
incidents.198 
Instead of dealing directly with the newly regulated scrap industry and risk arrest, 
thieves in France merely took their stolen scrap across the border to cash friendly 
countries, such as Germany and Holland, to receive payment for their stolen items. 
Therefore, the legislation was ineffective at reducing the overall amount of theft plaguing 
the nation. Data collected by the intelligence apparatus of the Gendarmerie in 2010 found 
that nearly 27.2 percent of those charged with copper theft in France were foreign 
nationals.199 
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When France pushed forward with additional legislation banning all cash 
payments in 2012, it was able to significantly reduce the number of reported copper theft 
incidents throughout the country. The Gendarmerie, as referenced in the case study, noted 
a significant reduction in theft incidents in 2012 compared to 2011. Based on the 
aforementioned figures regarding the demographics of copper thieves in France, it is safe 
to assume that cross-border theft likely still occurred after the cash ban. However, France 
was able to virtually eliminate the ability of copper thieves to receive payment for stolen 
items without having to make the costly cross border trips, which cut down significantly 
on the profitability of the criminal enterprise.  
Therefore, the primary difference between France and Italy is the ability of the 
French government to eradicate problems within its own borders by increasing the 
regulation of the scrap recycling industry. By eliminating the problem within their own 
borders, the French were able to dedicate their considerable law enforcement assets to 
international operations designed to stop organized crime elements from entering their 
country to steal copper. The criminal justice enterprise in France changed from an effort 
focused on local thieves and local enforcement to a strategy of national enforcement 
combined with international efforts, such as Interpol and Railpol.  
Ultimately, France achieved the measurable success that eluded Italy by 
successfully passing strict regulatory enforcement measures, redirecting law enforcement 
efforts to combating cross border thefts, and expanding penalties for individuals and 
scrap dealers that violate the enhanced regulatory measures regulating the scrap copper 
trade.  
D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER—THE UNITED KINGDOM 
France’s efforts to curb copper wire theft served as a platform for the United 
Kingdom, which heavily emulated France’s approach while adding additional measures 
that ultimately led to the largest recorded reductions in copper theft among the three case 
studies. The United Kingdom, through the extensive work of its Home Office, studied the 
successes and failures of other nations before undertaking a comprehensive plan to attack 
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copper wire theft within its borders. The United Kingdom case study revealed that the 
nation succeeded in achieving measurable success in three of the four design metrics.  
First, the law enforcement strategy within the United Kingdom towards copper 
theft changed significantly over time and can now realistically be displayed as a model 
for all other nations confronting the copper theft epidemic. In the early stages of the fight 
various police forces within the United Kingdom attempted to attack the problem at a 
local level, using a variety of traditional law enforcement methods typically associated 
with larceny. As noted in the case study, those efforts were generally successful in 
localized areas but did little to reduce the overall level of theft incidents within the nation. 
Furthermore, no one law enforcement entity was tasked with being the lead agency, 
which would have ensured better intelligence gathering, data collection, and analysis.  
Learning from its mistakes, the United Kingdom created a national metal theft 
task force, and designated the British Transport Police (BTP) as the lead agency.200 The 
United Kingdom enacted a wholesale change in the law enforcement enterprise related to 
copper theft within their nation. The overall national task force resulted in enhanced 
cooperation between agencies and ultimately led to better detection of theft incidents, 
serving as a catalyst in the overall reduction of copper theft incidents in the nation.201 
Neither Italy, which suffered from a well-documented, historic feud between national 
police agencies, nor France, with its separation of authority and duties between the 
Gendamerie and the National Police, were able to achieve to achieve the sustained level 
of law enforcement cooperation that the United Kingdom has with its BTP-led national 
task force.  
Second, the United Kingdom successfully passed the strictest regulation possible 
on the scrap recycling industry, the total ban of all cash transactions for scrap metal as 
well as a legal requirement to maintain identification information on all sellers. The 
United Kingdom passed legislation after other nations, such as France and Belgium, 
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forged ahead with cash bans. After other nations successfully banned cash transactions 
the United Kingdom did initially fall victim to a new phenomenon, called “theft tourism,” 
whereby organized crime groups entering the country to continue their copper theft 
operations.202 In that respect, the United Kingdom’s problems were similar to the issues 
currently faced by Italy, which lagged behind other nations in the strengthening of 
regulatory measures.  
After the cash ban, the United Kingdom reported a significant statistical drop in 
the amount of copper thefts inside the country. By any statistical measurement, the 
United Kingdom’s efforts resulted in success. Figure 7, published by the U. K. Power 
Networks, demonstrably shows the significant decrease in metal thefts between January 
of 2011 and January of 2013. Most surprisingly, the decrease in thefts occurs despite the 
overall stagnation of the price of copper on the world market, showing that the United 
Kingdom’s successes occurred independently from the copper price index.  
Figure 7.  Cable/Copper Theft Comparison with Market Trends 
 
Source: Metal Theft Focus Group [PowerPoint], UK Power Networks, February 28, 
2013, accessed October 1, 2015, https://www.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/Internet/en/have-
your-say/documents/Metal_theft_slide_deck_28Feb2013.pdf. 
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Replicating the success of the United Kingdom may be difficult in the United 
States due to the vast size of the country and the distinct laws governing the scrap metal 
industry in each of the 50 states. In 2015, Louisiana became the first state to pass a law 
banning cash transactions on all second hand items, including scrap metal and 
copper.203The Louisiana law lacks the enhanced regulation of scrap dealers present in the 
United Kingdom and the requirement to keep comprehensive identification records of all 
sellers.  
Aside from legislative efforts, there have been many enhanced and targeted law 
enforcement activities in the United States reminiscent of Operation Fragment and other 
earlier efforts in the United Kingdom. Each of the activities tried in the United States has 
lacked the regulatory enhancements of Operation Tornado. In order to replicate the 
success of the United Kingdom, the United States will have to explore a comprehensive, 
cross-state, regulatory, and enforcement proposal to tackle the rising copper theft 
problem.  
Comparing efforts in the United States to the three case study nations is necessary 
to determine which of the measures and programs may be adaptable to the copper theft 
strategy within the United States. Unfortunately, to date, the United States has not 
implemented any comprehensive copper theft strategy and its efforts as a nation lag 
behind those of even Italy.  
E. APPLICATION OF CASE STUDIES TO UNITED STATES POLICY 
A careful review of the three case studies reveals that many of the programs and 
initiatives implemented in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have been either 
attempted, or proposed, in the United State in various forms at the state and local levels. 
However, no law enforcement program, legislation, or enhanced regulatory efforts have 
been successfully implemented at the national level. In that respect, the approach taken 
by the United States closely mirrors the approach taken by the Italians, whose efforts the 
case study analysis demonstrates have not been successful on any level over the past 10 
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years. An analysis of the United States’ efforts within the four research metrics clearly 
demonstrates the overall failure of efforts within the United States.  
The first measurement used to evaluate the case study nations was an evaluation 
of their efforts to enhance regulation of the scrap recycling industry. While France and 
the United Kingdom both greatly enhanced regulation of the industry Italy did not. The 
United States, like Italy, has done nothing to enhance nationwide regulation of the scrap 
industry. Various states, such as the aforementioned example in Louisiana, have 
attempted to enhance statewide regulation. A study prepared by the Institute of Scrap 
Recycling Industries (ISRI), one of the primary stakeholders in the metal theft fight in the 
United States, found that all 50 states in the country had passed various forms of 
legislation aimed at increasing regulation of the scrap recycling industry within the past 
10 years.204 
The legislation, as noted by ISRI, lacks uniformity and as a result, enterprising 
metal thieves merely take their stolen products out of states with heavy regulation to 
those states that lack any regulatory measures. In that respect, the problems faced within 
the United States are very similar to Italy as criminals merely cross borders to find areas 
with lax regulations willing to pay cash for scrap with minimal licensing requirements. 
There are a variety of anecdotal media reports that strongly suggest that the enhancement 
of state level regulations has been an abject failure. In Texas, for instance, a law passed in 
2008 forced scrap dealers to collect verifiable identification from sellers, as well as 
holding all purchased items for three days prior to repurposing it.205 In spite of the 
passage of that law, copper theft incidents continued to be a problem throughout Texas, 
so much so that in 2015, the Sheriff’s Association of Texas proposed new legislation that 
would restrict all cash transactions for copper theft in the state and require each seller to 
be fingerprinted at the point of sale.206 
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Aside from state level efforts, efforts to pass enhanced scrap recycling regulation 
have failed miserably at the federal level, which has resulted in the wide variety of state 
level solutions that do not address the overall national problem. The first real national 
effort pushed forward in the U. S. Congress was the Copper Theft Prevention Act of 
2008, which required scrap recyclers to document all transactions as well as imposing 
civil penalties for those dealers that violate the law.207 The 2008 act never made it to the 
floor of either the House of Representatives or the Senate for a vote.  
As copper theft incidents continued to rise in the United States, a new measure 
was proposed in Congress called the Metal Theft Prevention Act of 2013.208 The act, 
entered onto the congressional calendar as Senate Bill S. 394 and House of 
Representatives Bill H. R. 867, specified that all cash transactions for scrap metal in the 
United States would be limited to a total of $100. It also included the implementation of 
other measures such as identification requirements and strong civil penalties for those 
entities found to be in violation of the new law.209 The bills ran into heavy opposition in 
Congress, particularly from Republicans that argued the measures imposed undue federal 
burdens on the states while violating the Commerce Clause of the constitution.210 The 
bills also ran into resistance from ISRI, various state level attorney generals and states’ 
rights advocacy groups.211 As a result of opposition the House bill never made it out of 
its committee, while the Senate bill never received a full vote. At various times over the 
past eight years, the Metal Theft Prevention Act, in various forms, has been proposed but 
never enacted, resulting in a total lack of federal guidance for states attempting to combat 
the copper theft problem in the United States.  
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Like France and the United Kingdom, the United States has also failed to achieve 
any success within the second measurable metric of this research project, which evaluates 
the effective imposition of legal changes that levy enhanced criminal sanctions on copper 
thieves. To date the U. S. Congress has neither proposed, nor enacted, any legislation 
amending the federal code to provide for enhanced penalties for those convicted of 
copper wire theft.  
The closest the federal government has come to considering enhanced criminal 
legislation was an amendment to the Metal Theft Prevention Act that would have 
imposed “10-year prison sentence on anyone caught stealing metal from telephone or cell 
towers, highway equipment or other critical infrastructure.”212 Various states have 
enacted enhancements for penalties related to copper theft, but the inability to federalize 
the crime has ultimately led to a situation very similar to that in Italy where crimes are 
prosecuted and penalized differently depending on the region of the country.  
The United States would also score very poorly on the third metric, which 
measures changes in criminal justice strategy. While copper theft within the United States 
has been prevalent in media headlines and been discussed in a variety of law enforcement 
forums, such as the Police Executive Research Forum and the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, to date no coordinated federal strategy has been proposed or 
developed within the nation. Instead, the United States relies on a local approach to 
combat the crime, very similar to the early efforts within the United Kingdom. Rather 
than focus efforts on a broad task force that has far-reaching powers, the United States 
instead relies on law enforcement strategies at the state and local levels.  
An example of a successful regional effort in the United States is the Southeast 
Metal Theft Task Force, comprised of large law enforcement agencies such as the Atlanta 
Police Department, the Birmingham Police Department, various sheriff departments in 
the Georgia and Alabama region, local prosecutors, and various scrap recycling 
                                                 




businesses.213 The task force is very similar in nature to the approach taken in Somerset, 
England with Operation Fragment, which was highlighted in the case study. While the 
approach produced significant arrests it did little to curb the number of theft incidents. 
Similarly, the Southeast Metal Task Force has failed to produce any data demonstrating a 
decline in copper theft incidents independent of the copper commodity price index.  
All three countries highlighted in the case study changed their criminal justice 
strategy in some respect, whether creating a national task force or developing a theft 
monitoring system. The United States has continued to rely on local solutions and local 
arrests to combat a problem that is clearly international in nature. The inability to 
establish a national task force has prohibited law enforcement elements in the United 
States from cooperating with international groups and developing best practices that 
mirror successful anti-theft initiatives, such as those undertaken in the United Kingdom.  
On the final metric, which rated measured reductions in copper theft incidents, it 
would be difficult to accurately rate the United States due to the lack of statistical data 
specifically related to copper theft. By failing to designate an organization to maintain 
statistical data, as has been done in the United Kingdom with the British Transport Police 
and in France with the Gendarmerie, the United States has lacked the ability to accurately 
determine the specific rate of copper theft incidents that occur throughout the nation. 
Anecdotal evidence supplied by the National Insurance Crime Bureau at the end of 
calendar year 2013 noted a decline in insurance claims related to copper theft between 
2011 and 2013.214 The report does not note a reason for the decline in insurance claims; 
however, a review of copper prices over the past five years in the Figure 8 (provided by 
Kitco Metals) demonstrates that the price of copper on the open market has been steadily 
declining, possibly accounting for the corresponding drop in reported incidents in the 
United States, 
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Figure 8.  Five Year Copper Spot 
 
Source: “Spot Copper Historical Charts and Graphs, Copper Charts, Industrial Metals,” 
Kitco, accessed October 31, 2015, http://www.kitcometals.com/charts/copper 
_historical_large.html.  
Without definitive statistical evidence to show that United States’ efforts have 
been successful at reducing copper theft independent of the commodity price index, there 
is no way to empirically prove that any of the approaches taken within the United States 
have been successful in any manner. Instead, it appears that theft incidents rise and fall 
with the commodity price index, which indicates that when the demand for copper 
increases in the future, the United States will likely again be victimized at unacceptable 
levels by copper thieves.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The analysis undertaken in this section clearly demonstrates that the United 
Kingdom and France have both achieved success in the fight against copper theft, albeit 
with different levels of success. Italy, which has attempted very few initiatives, has not 
achieved any measure of success and its efforts failed in nearly every metric of the 
research design. Unfortunately, the efforts undertaken by the United States to date most 
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closely mirror those of Italy. In fact, the United States has actually done less at a national 
level than Italy has.  
Replicating the success of France and the United Kingdom will be difficult in the 
United States, however, due to a wide variety of impediments. To replicate the successful 
measures undertaken by the United Kingdom, there are a significant number of hurdles to 
overcome. Much of the success in the United Kingdom is a result of the nation’s ability 
to designate the British Transport Police as the lead law enforcement agency responsible 
for all copper theft operations and intelligence. The British Transport Police is a national 
police organization with jurisdiction throughout the nation, and there simply is no 
counterpart in the United States that possesses such broad power. In the most recent 
census related to law enforcement in the United States, it was found that there are 
approximately 17,895 state and local law enforcement agencies.215 In order to coordinate 
the efforts of those agencies and the various other federal agencies operating within the 
country, significant legislative action and policy changes would have to be undertaken by 
the federal government.  
Federal regulation of the scrap recycling industry, replicating measures 
implemented in the United Kingdom and France, also faces significant hurdles in the 
United States, as evidenced by the inability of Congress to even consider a vote on the 
various iterations of the Metal Theft Prevention Acts that have been proposed over the 
past seven years. Regulation of the scrap industry has typically been left to the discretion 
of individual states and municipalities, and the nationalization of the process in the 
United States would constitute a significant change requiring congressional approval. 
Successful passage of nationalized regulation would also likely result in a lawsuit from 
various state attorney generals who continually seek to check the power wielded by the 
federal government.  
Regardless of the various impediments to change within the United States, it is 
clear that in order to develop a successful anti-copper theft program that protects critical 
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infrastructure, a comprehensive plan must be developed based on the lessons learned 
from United Kingdom, Italy, and France. While each program and initiative cannot be 
identically replicated within the United States, there are policies and initiatives that 
should be considered that may ultimately succeed in the overall reduction of reported 





VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The evidence presented in this research study clearly demonstrates that incidents 
of copper theft pose a significant danger to critical infrastructure facilities within the 
United States, and as a result, they pose a significant danger to the overall security of the 
homeland. Efforts have been undertaken in a variety of other nations throughout the 
world to attack the copper theft epidemic with mixed results. Based on the evidence 
presented within this study, the United States needs to take a new approach in the fight 
against copper theft by learning from the successes and failures undertaken by the three 
research subject nations: the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.  
The concluding chapter of this project includes a brief overview of the limitations 
of the research reviewed, recommendations for future research, and recommendations for 
changes within the relevant policies and criminal justice programs within the United 
States. The failure to adopt new policies within the United States will ultimately allow 
the copper theft epidemic to continue unabated.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
Although the research in this project clearly defines a path to follow in the fight 
against copper theft, there are a number of limitations within the design process that merit 
further examination. Those limitations include the scope of the project, the availability of 
relevant data, and the Euro-centric design of the study. Each of the limitations must be 
considered when making an overall recommendation regarding future path of policy 
within the United States.  
The scope of the project is the first limitation that must be considered. Due to the 
complexity of obtaining research from foreign nations, only three nations were chosen for 
the study. Copper theft is a worldwide phenomenon that has an effect on nearly every 
nation around the globe, regardless of the size of the nation or its economic prowess. 
While the results of each case study provide a meaningful sample of three different 
approaches to the copper theft epidemic, consideration must be given to the fact that 
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other nations may have very different approaches that may have also successfully led to a 
decrease in reported copper theft incidents.  
Aside from the limitations in scope, the availability of data related to the copper 
theft problem was also a significant impediment and limitation in the research design. As 
noted often throughout this research study, each nation sampled was found to use a 
variety of different methods to track copper theft incidents within their borders. Of the 
three nations sampled, only the United Kingdom formally designated a single 
government entity to collect relevant data related to copper and metal theft. Without 
formal data, the research results within France and Italy were limited to anecdotal media 
accounts, sample one time reports from a variety of government sources, data from 
industry sources, and information obtained through insurance agencies. The lack of 
formal regulated data from verifiable government sources limited the ability to verify the 
accuracy of the reported open source data.  
The final limitation of the study is related specifically to the Euro-centric design 
of the research. The three nations sampled for the case study were all in Europe and all in 
relative close proximity to each other geographically. As a result, the research was 
limited to one small section of the world that has been adversely affected by copper theft. 
It is certainly possible that the results of the study may have been very different had a 
sampling been undertaken from disparate nations located around the globe. The lack of 
available research data and the time limitations of this project made such a sampling 
impractical. In order to build upon this project, future research must account for the 
limitations of this study.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In light of the various limitations related to this research, there are a number of 
recommendations for any future research projects related to the copper theft epidemic. 
Future research projects may be able to mitigate or eliminate the various issues that were 
confronted during the course of this project. Therefore, to successfully examine the 
copper theft epidemic in the future, a variety of methods should be undertaken.  
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First, care must be given to expand the scope of any future research. Research 
must be obtained from more locations and nations in order to explore the wide variety of 
initiatives and alternatives have likely been explored by nations outside the scope of the 
current research. Rather than limiting the design of future studies to a small number of 
nations, care must be given to exploring disparate nations in a wide variety of locations.  
Second, in order to account for the lack of verifiable data from government 
sources related to the copper theft problem, researchers should design metrics that 
include a wide variety of sources. Media accounts of copper theft are prevalent 
throughout the world. Future research should include metrics that catalogue and analyze 
media reported incidents. Furthermore, research must also include metrics that analyze 
reported insurance claims from each of the case study nations that are selected.  
Finally, future research must account for the considerable influence that the 
copper-theft commodity price index has over the illicit copper trade. Statistics and data 
within the current project suggest that the commodity price index can greatly influence 
statistics related to copper theft incidents. Only with a comprehensive examination of the 
copper theft price index can a strong recommendation be made to design policies that will 
be successfully independent of fluctuations in the commodity price.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
A careful examination of the results of the case studies, combined with an 
examination of current policy in the United States, has led to a variety of 
recommendations. The United States must take unilateral national action in the fight 
against the copper theft epidemic. To continue on its current path, the United States 
ultimately risks continued economic hardship and immeasurable risk to the critical 
infrastructure components located throughout the nation. In order to mitigate the future 
effects of copper theft, policymakers within the United States should consider the 
measures outlined in the next sections:  
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1. Establish a Centralized Metal Theft Monitoring Center 
The United States’ approach to date, as evidenced by the case study analysis, has 
been most similar to the Italian approach. Neither nation has undertaken any meaningful 
nationwide initiative that has had any impact on reducing the overall number of reported 
copper theft incidents; however, Italy did successfully create the National Theft 
Monitoring Centre. While the creation of the center has not been proven to have had any 
meaningful impact on the reduction of copper theft in Italy, it has allowed the nation to 
better understand the extent of the problem within its borders.  
The United States does not currently have a formal mechanism to record copper 
theft incidents or to coordinate the various law enforcement effort that are underway at 
the state and local levels. Various entities, including the Institute for Scrap Recycling 
Industries (ISRI), have developed mechanisms to record theft incidents. The ISRI 
platform, known as ScrapTheftAlert. com, encourages various industries and law 
enforcement entities to input copper theft incidents and specific identifying information 
for stolen products into an online database for tracking purposes.216 As the platform is 
operated by a private industry advocate, submission of incident data to the platform is 
purely voluntary and does not present an accurate snapshot of the extent of the theft 
problem.  
Industry resources, such as ISRI, and the various other industrial advocacy 
associations throughout the United States (including the American Association of 
Railroads, the American Public Power Association, and various others) should be 
included in the planning and ultimate operation of any national monitoring center. The 
creation of a theft monitoring center without the input and financial resources of the 
industrial stakeholders would likely result in failure.  
Legislation calling for the creation of a monitoring center must include language 
that compels the various law enforcement agencies of the United States to report 
confirmed incidents of copper theft to the center. In that respect, the center should 
                                                 
216 “Home,” ScrapTheftAlert, accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.scraptheftalert.com/Home/
Home.aspx.  
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function in a manner similar to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which 
allows law enforcement user agencies to input and retrieve information on a variety of 
crimes.217 NCIC is not the only precedent in the United States for creating a national 
center dedicated to a specific area of criminality.  
Congress has also authorized the creation of the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children and the National Sex Offender Database. Each program is national in 
scope and receives direct input from federal, state, and local agencies to advance their 
missions. The creation of a National Metal Theft Monitoring Center would not be an easy 
process but would be absolutely integral in the fight against metal theft nationwide, 
especially if the United States continues to be unsuccessful at passing meaningful 
regulatory legislation related to the scrap recycling industry.  
2. Reintroduce Comprehensive Regulatory Legislation  
The United States has consistently failed to pass regulatory measures aimed at 
controlling the scrap recycling industry on a national level. As a result, copper theft 
incidents continue to occur throughout the United States. The efforts of the United 
Kingdom have shown that comprehensive regulation, including the abolishment of cash 
transactions for scrap metal and enhanced transaction tracking capabilities, have a 
significant impact on the illicit copper trade. Nefarious actors are prohibited from 
exchanging stolen products for quick cash in the United Kingdom, and as a result, the 
number of reported incidents has drastically decreased since the enactment of the 
measure.  
There are numerous hurdles that will have to be overcome within the United 
States in order to enact national legislation, not the least of which is the strong objection 
of the states’ rights wing of the Republican Party that believes a national regulation is a 
violation of the Constitution. Many of those politicians believe that states are better 
equipped to handle the problem. Statistics clearly have shown, however, that is not an 
accurate assumption and that a national solution is needed.  
                                                 
217 “National Crime Information Center,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 17, 2010, accessed 
November 3, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic.   
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Various iterations of the National Metal Theft Prevention Act have been proposed 
over the past eight years. To date the bill has not received a vote in Congress. If the 
United States is serious about confronting the copper theft crisis, it must be willing to 
consider a national solution. Otherwise results will continue to mirror those in Italy, 
where theft is rampant in various regions throughout the country.  
3. Creation of Federal Penalties for Copper Wire Theft  
Any meaningful legislation must include enhanced criminal penalties for copper 
wire theft. While various states have enacted criminal enhancements for copper theft 
offenses, an offense category is needed at the federal level to protect the various forms of 
critical infrastructure located throughout the nation.  
Federal penalties should be created for any offense deemed to have occurred at a 
facility designated as part of the national critical infrastructure. Those facilities, as noted 
by the Department of Homeland Security, are those facilities that are vital to the nation’s 
physical and economic security. Any thief caught stealing from any facility deemed to be 
critical infrastructure should face federal criminal charges and federal prison time. The 
creation of a federal penalty would likely serve as a significant deterrent to potential 
copper thieves throughout the United States.  
4. Designate a Primary Law Enforcement Agency  
The United Kingdom is the most successful nation analyzed in the case studies 
primarily because all law enforcement operations related to copper theft within its nation 
were centralized under one authority, the British Transport Police. While all agencies 
within the nation continue to participate in the enforcement of laws and as members of 
various task forces, the BTP has the primary responsibility for the management of 
operations and the enforcement of regulations related to the copper theft trade.  
The United States should replicate the success of the United Kingdom by 
designating a single federal agency as the sole agency responsible for copper theft 
operations. The agency should be a central clearinghouse for all copper theft statistics as 
well as the primary organizer for all task force operations throughout the country. 
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Whatever agency that is designated must have a clear mandate to enforce regulations 
related to the scrap recycling industry as well as statutory authority to operate within all 
50states. There are a number of federal agencies that have the capability of national 
operations, including the Department of Commerce, the Department of Treasury, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
5. Increase Cooperation with Canada and Mexico 
Policymakers in the United States must be mindful that any new set of regulations 
or laws within the United States that govern the scrap recycling industry must be enacted 
in accordance with similar laws and initiatives within Canada and Mexico. To curb the 
copper theft epidemic successfully, policymakers must be willing to work with the 
governments of those two bordering nations. Failure to do so may result in a situation that 
mirrors that of Italy.  
This thesis has demonstrated that one of the primary catalysts for the failure of the 
Italian efforts has been the proliferation of cross border smuggling operations that 
originate in countries bordering Italy. Should the United States implement new regulatory 
measures but fail to work with Canada and Mexico, it is likely that cross border 
smuggling operations similar to those in Europe may begin to appear in North America.  
E. CONCLUSION  
Ultimately, this research project set out to determine best practices to guide the 
United States in the fight against the copper theft epidemic. The efforts and initiatives 
related to copper theft that were undertaken in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy 
were examined in order to determine if any of the three nations had found any success in 
reducing the number of reported copper theft incidents within their respective borders. 
Following careful examination of each case study, a number of conclusions as a result of 
this research project.  
First and foremost, the failure to take action on a national level will allow the 
copper theft epidemic to continue in perpetuity. The cases of the United Kingdom and 
France have proven that a measurable reduction in copper theft incidents can be had if a 
national system of regulatory measures is implemented with respect to the scrap recycling 
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industry. Italy has failed to achieve any measurable success in the copper theft fight, 
primarily because of its inability to develop a comprehensive national regulatory solution. 
The current lack of policy within the United States closely mirrors that of Italy and is a 
primary reason why copper theft continues to be an issue in all 50states.  
Second, law enforcement strategies have proven to be far more successful when 
directed by a single component, such as the British Transport Police. While enhanced 
regulation of the scrap recycling industry accounted for the majority of the reduction in 
reported incidents in the United Kingdom, without the consolidation of law enforcement 
efforts, it is likely that its level of success in the copper theft fight would not have been 
nearly as high. The United States and Italy have failed to combine efforts of law 
enforcement under one unifying umbrella, resulting in a scattered approach, heavily 
reliant on local initiatives. The lack of a national law enforcement strategy has crippled 
both the efforts of both nations.  
Finally, the nations that have had the most success in the copper theft fight are 
those nations that have developed comprehensive approaches involving increased 
regulation, enhanced criminal penalties, unified law enforcement strategy, and the 
engagement of a variety of stakeholders. The copper theft epidemic is a complicated 
problem that requires a complicated solution. Simply enacting one initiative, such as the 
National Monitoring Centre in Italy, is not enough to eradicate the problem. 
Policymakers must be willing to attack the problem in a variety of ways in order to 
achieve any measurable amount of success.  
The path to success has been paved by the forward thinking nations of the United 
Kingdom and France. In order to protect the United States homeland effectively from 
enterprising copper thieves, a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, including 
enhanced regulation of the scrap recycling industry, increased criminal penalties, and the 
designation of a primary law enforcement agency, are absolute necessities. Any solution 
that does not incorporate those initiatives will likely fail, and as a result, copper theft will 
continue to pose a significant problem for critical infrastructure components throughout 
the United States.  
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